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1ABSTRACT:
This paper explores the current state of regulation of controlled substances at the federal
and state level and analyzes how such regulations impact the undertreatment of pain and
prescription drug abuse. Taking a historical view of the pain treatment movement and using
the recent OxyContin crisis as a case study, the future of controlled substance policy as it
relates to painkillers is analyzed. It argues that any successful policy will have to do a better
job of balancing law enforcement and health care goals.
I. Introduction
The undertreatment of pain in America has become a crippling problem. The American Pain Society es-
timates that 44 million households have at least one member suﬀering from chronic pain.1 The American
Medical Association estimates the total number of Americans with chronic pain at 75 million.2 The problem
is even worse for those aged 65 or older, of whom 20-40% suﬀer from long-term pain – pain that is only prop-
erly treated in a fraction of cases.3 Overall it is estimated that only one out of every four persons suﬀering
from chronic pain receives adequate pain treatment.4 The ﬁnancial cost, over and above the personal costs,
is enormous as well, with estimates placing the cost of lost productivity and treatment at as much as $100
billion a year in the United States.5
Beyond chronic pain, many have found their ﬁnal days marred by the presence of uncontrolled and unnec-
essary pain as well. A groundbreaking 1995 study involving more than 9000 patients in ﬁve large hospitals
across the country found, among other lapses, that half of patients experienced moderate to severe pain in
1See Rita Rubin, Powerful Painkillers: A Reprieve for Patients, but a Conﬂict for Doctors, USA Today, Aug. 9, 2001.
2See Dr. Donald Palmisano, Chronic Pain Remains Relevant Issue, USA Today, November 13, 2003. (Dr. Palmisano is
the President of the American Medical Association).
3See Kelly Greene, Geriatrics Group to Release New Recommendations On Management of Pain, Wall St. J., May 9,
2002.
4See Carolyn Kleiner, A Curse and a Cure, U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 6, 2001.
5See Patrick J. Michaels, A DEA Crackdown That’s Going to Hurt Those in Pain, Wash. Post, Feb. 29, 2004; See also
Melanie Thernstrom, Pain, The Disease, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2001; Michael J. Reynolds, Note, Morphine or Malpractice:
Should Court Recognize a Legal Duty to Prescribe Opiates for Treating Chronic Pain, 15 St. John’s L. Comment 79, 79
(2000) (estimating the cost of undertreated chronic pain at $70 billion).
2the three days prior to death.6 A 1998 study of nursing home patients with cancer found similar results,
concluding that daily pain is common in almost 40% of patients and that such pain if often undertreated.7
Even more disturbing, studies have also shown that undertreatment is often far more prevalent among non-
white patients.8
The tragedy of such ﬁndings is that many experts agree that such pain is completely unnecessary and avoid-
able.9 Unfortunately, unlike other medical challenges faced over the past century, the primary obstacle in
the quest to provide adequate pain treatment for all who require it is not the lack of adequate medication or
technology. Rather, the largest roadblocks come from the unique characteristics of pain itself and the drugs
required to treat it. These obstacles will be discussed at length in the next sections, but it is useful to touch
on some brieﬂy at this point.
Pain10, ﬁrst of all, is largely a subjective condition – there are generally no objective tests to conﬁrm its
existence.11 As Barry Meier describes it:
6Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (“Support”) Principal Investigators,
A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients, 274 JAMA 1591, 1594 (1995).
7See Roberto Bernabei et al., Management of Pain in Elderly Patients with Cancer, 279 JAMA 1877, 1877 (1998).
8See Vence L. Bonham, Race, Ethnicity, and Pain Treatment: Striving to Understand the Causes and Solutions to Dispar-
ities in Pain Treatment, 29 J.L. Med. & Ethics 52 (2001).
9See James Cleary, Treatment of Pain at the End of Life: A Position Statement from the American Pain Society (90% of
dying cancer patients can have their pain adequately treated by well-trained physicians); See also Kathryn L. Tucker, A New
Risk Emerges: Provider Accountability For Inadequate Treatment of Pain,9 Annals of Long-Term Care 52, 52 (2002).
10One often-referenced deﬁnition of “pain” is as follows: “An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with
actual or potential tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage.... Pain is always subjective.... Each individual
learns the application of the word through experiences related to injury in early life....Experiences which resemble pain, e.g.,
pricking, but are not unpleasant, should not be called pain. Unpleasant abnormal experiences may also be pain but are not
necessarily so because, subjectively, they may not have the usual sensory qualities of pain. Many people report pain in the
absence of tissue damage or any likely pathological cause; usually this happens for psychological reasons. There is no way to
distinguish their experience from that due to tissue damage if we take the subjective report. If they regard their experience
as pain and if they report it in the same ways as pain caused by tissue damage, it should be accepted as pain. This deﬁnition
avoids tying pain to the stimulus.” International Association for the Study of Pain, Pain Terms: A List with Deﬁnitions and
Notes on Usage, 6 Pain 249 (1979).
11See, David B. Morris, Illness and Culture in the Postmodern Age, 119 (1998); See also Ben A. Rich, A Prescription
for the Pain: The Emerging Standard of Care for Pain Management, 26 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1, 21 (2000) (“Chronic
pain syndromes are almost by deﬁnition conditions in which the degree of objectively veriﬁable pathology does not explain (or
justify) the patient’s complaints of pain and/or claims of functional disability.”).
3There is no pain thermometer, no pain gauge, no pain meter. A doctor can’t send
a patient’s blood out hoping to ﬁnd clues about his or her pain and its intensity.
Technology...is sometimes helpful but notoriously unreliable. For instance, while 80
percent of those people who complain of back pain have X rays that show evidence of
spinal disc degeneration, about 70 percent of all adults who exhibit similar problems
on X rays have no pain. The science of measuring pain had made such little progress
by the end of the twentieth century that one of its key tools was a scale of crude
cartoonlike faces that ranged from smiling to grimacing, to which patients pointed
to indicate their pain’s intensity.12
This, on its own, may be an explanation for a good part of the undertreatment problem – as the treatment
of chronic pain as a condition independent from an underlying disease runs contrary to the curative model
of medicine that many physicians have been taught to practice. 13 If that was the only obstacle to eﬀective
pain treatment, the problem could perhaps be solved with an eﬀective educational campaign. Unfortunately
for those suﬀering from pain, it is not.
A more diﬃcult problem to overcome in resolving the policy challenges around the relief of pain is that, in
many cases, the most eﬀective treatment for chronic and end of life pain is the use of opiate14 analgesics.15
These same narcotics, however, also have a high potential for non-medical abuse and addiction when ad-
ministered improperly.16 As a result, they are highly regulated at both the federal17 and state levels.18
13See Ben A. Rich, A Prescription for the Pain: The Emerging Standard of Car for Pain Management, 26 Wm. Mitchell
L. Rev. 1, 23-24 (2000) (“The curative model devalues or discounts anything that is subjective and, hence, not objectively
veriﬁable and quantiﬁable. Since pain and suﬀering, understood as sensation and emotion, are quintessentially subjective human
experiences, they lie outside of the acceptable parameters of the curative model.”); See also Ellen Fox, Predominance of the
Curative Model of Medical Care: A Residual Problem, 278 JAMA 761 (1997).
14Opioids include codeine, morphine, hydrocodone, oxycodone and fentanyl. The word itself refers to the “natural and
semi-synthetic derivatives of the opium poppy, as well as similar synthetic compounds that have analgesic or pain relieving
properties because of their eﬀects in the central nervous system.” David E. Joranson et al., Achieving Balance in State
Pain Policy: A Progress Report Card (2004) (available at http://www.medsch.wisc.edu/painpolicy).
15See interview with Russell Portenoy, Chairman of Pain Medicine and Palliative Care at Beth Israel Medical Center
in New York City (Apr. 23, 2004) (estimating that 30-50% of patients with serious pain problems could beneﬁt from
some form of opioid therapy); See also Kathy Foley, Opioids and Chronic Neuropathic Pain, 348 New Engl. J. Med.
1279, 1279-81; Russell Portenoy, Current Pharmacotherapy of Chronic Pain, 19 J. Pain Symptom Manage. S16, S16-S20
(2000); World Health Organization, Cancer Pain Relief: With a Guide to Opioid Availability (1996) (available at
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/9241544821.pdf).
16See 21 U.S.C. §812(b)(2).
17See 21 U.S.C. §811.
18See David E. Joranson et al., Achieving Balance in State Pain Policy: A Progress Report Card (2004) (available
at: http://www.medsch.wisc.edu/painpolicy).
4Despite the regulation, however, prescription drug abuse continues to grow as a major public health prob-
lem.19 Though these regulations aim only to prevent drug abuse and diversion20, they often have the eﬀect
of chilling legitimate medical treatment as physicians often fear that prescribing such drugs will attract
regulatory and criminal scrutiny, even when such treatment is well within the scope of accepted medical
practice.21 This fear has only increased in recent years with the high-proﬁle crackdowns by federal and
state law enforcement oﬃcials on physicians who have been accused of illegally diverting the controversial
painkiller OxyContin.22 Many also believe that the recent threat by Attorney General John Ashcroft to use
the Controlled Substances Act to target Oregon physicians using federally controlled substances and acting
under the state’s Death with Dignity Act has added to the regulatory fears of all physicians treating patients
in pain at the end of life – regardless of whether they were engaged in physician-assisted suicide.23
This confusion is only augmented by the subjective nature of pain discussed above. As Dr. James Mickle,
a family doctor in Pennsylvania put it, the dilemma for doctors when confronted with a pain patient is
complex: “Is it objective or subjective? How do you know you’re not being tricked or taken advantage of to
get narcotics? And chronic-pain patients are, generally, well – a pain. Most doctors’ reaction to a patient
19See Michael Janofsky, Drug-Fighters Turn to Rising Tide of Prescription Abuse, N.Y Times, Mar. 18, 2004 (reporting
that prescription drugs have overtaken amphetamines as the second most abused drug in the country).
20See Asa Hutchinson, Statement to House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and
Judiciary (Dec. 11, 2001) (available at: http://www.health.org/govpubs/dea/0112oxytestimony.aspx).
21See David Joranson et al., Controlled Substances, Medical Practice, and the Law, in Psychiatric Practice Under Fire:
The Influence of Government, the Media, and Special Interests on Somatic Therapies 173-194 (H. Schwartz ed.,
1994).
22See Barry Meier, OxyContin Prescribers Face Charges in Fatal Overdoses, N.Y Times, Jan. 19, 2002; see also Barry Meier,
A Small-Town Clinic Looms Large as a Top Source of Disputed Painkillers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 2002; Bill Kaczor, Panhandle
Doctor’s OxyContin Conviction to Send Message, Denver Rocky Mountain News, Feb. 20, 2002; Doctor Given Long Prison
Term for 4 Deaths Tied to OxyContin, New York Times, Mar. 23, 2002; Josh White, Citing U.S. Probe, Va. Doctor Says
He’ll Close Practice, Wash. Post, Aug. 31, 2002; Catherine Saillant, Ventura County Doctor Focus of Painkiller Inquiry,
L.A. Times, Mar. 7, 2003; Marc Kaufman, Worried Pain Doctors Decry Prosecutions, Wash. Post, Dec. 29, 2003.
23Interview with Barbara Coombs-Lee, President of Compassion in Dying in Portland, Oregon (Apr. 5, 2004) (“Creating the
crime of ‘intending death’ with a controlled substance would jeopardize pain and symptom management for terminal patients.
Hospice physicians and palliative care specialists understand this well. Doctors should not have to justify their intentions
whenever death occurs soon after administration of strong medication to a dying patient. The threat of such justiﬁcation
prompts doctors to withhold pain car and causes unnecessary suﬀering on a grand scale.”).
5with chronic pain is to try to pass them oﬀ to someone who’s sympathetic.”24
This paper seeks to explore this increasingly complex intersection of pain relief, opioid abuse and government
regulation. It will demonstrate why the current response by both government and the medical profession
has been woefully inadequate and will propose a change of policy that will return the country back toward
progress in the war against pain while still taking seriously the threat of prescription drug diversion and
abuse.
The ﬁrst section will examine the history and dimensions of the undertreatment of pain problem in the
United States over the past 25 years. The second section will brieﬂy explore the history of opioid use and
abuse, with a focus on the recent surge in OxyContin diversion. The third section will outline and evaluate
the existing regulatory structure governing the use of opiates both at the federal and state level as well as
the recent response by the government, the medical profession and the law to both pain and opiate abuse.
The ﬁnal section will propose a series of policy changes for the medical, regulatory and legal community to
advance goals of pain relief while minimizing suﬀering from both undertreatment and prescription abuse
II. The Problem – The Epidemic of Undertreatment
a. The Nature of Pain
As the numbers above indicate, the problem of undertreatment of pain is vast. As Dr. Russell Portenoy,
24See Melanie Thernstrom, Pain, The Disease, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2001.
6the chairman of pain medicine and palliative care at Beth Israel Medical Center, describes it, “there is an
epidemic of chronic pain in the United States.”25 But before the potential causes of the “epidemic” are
explored, it is perhaps best to begin by explaining what is meant by “pain.”
The word “pain” itself is a broad term and can usefully be divided into three subcategories: acute, intractable,
and cancer (or chronic non-malignant).26 Acute pain is best thought of as the normal sensation that is
triggered by the nervous system when one is injured.27 The pain often is proportional to the level of damage
to the body and it disappears when the underlying problem is cured or repaired.28
Chronic pain is fundamentally diﬀerent – it is persistent and feeds back onto itself. The pain itself can
actually create more pain in what doctors call “chronic-pain windup.”29 Though it may be triggered by
an initial injury such as a back injury, it can occur without any evidence of past physical damage. It
often manifests itself in the form of migraine headaches, cluster headaches, lower back pain, and other
sensations.30 Tragically, those with chronic pain also often develop anxiety and depression, as both chronic
pain and depression stem from similar serotonin and endorphin imbalances.31 In the case of chronic pain
suﬀerers, the imbalances are triggered by extended stress responses produced by the body in dealing with
the pain. Often, depression and anxiety not only stem from the pain, but also enhance the pain.32 The cycle
of pain and depression often leaves its victims incapable of sustained work, a normal family life and other
25See Josh White, DEA Backs Medical Use of OxyContin, Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 2001.
26See Ronald Melzack & Patrick D. Wall, The Challenge of Pain 52-56 (1982); See also Ben Rich, A Prescription
for the Pain: The Emerging Standard of Care for Pain Management, 26 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1, n. 8 (2000).
27See National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, NINDS Chronic Pain Information Page
(http://www.ninds.nih.gov/health and medical/disorders/chronic pain.htm).
28See Thernstrom supra note 24.
29Id.
30See supra note 25.
31See supra note 24.
32Id.
7supportive social interactions.33
Ongoing and severe pain also often accompanies cancer as malignant tumors put pressure on sensitive nerves
or destroy bones.34 Though similar to chronic pain, cancer pain diﬀers fundamentally in that the trajectory
of the pain often culminates in death, while the chronic pain patient must manage their pain throughout
their lifetime.35
b. The Reasons for Undertreatment
With so many millions of Americans in pain, often debilitating pain, that is very often treatable, how is it
that the problem has been able to persist so long? The answer to that question is one that has consumed
the energies of a dedicated core of pain physicians across the country for more than two decades. Identifying
the answer to this question is critical to formulating policies that address the problems underlying the
undertreatment of pain.
1. Fear of regulatory scrutiny:
Though many diﬀerent reasons have been oﬀered to explain the undertreatment of pain, nearly all agree
that physician fear of regulatory scrutiny by state medical boards, prosecutors or the Drug Enforcement
33See Jane Brody, Misunderstood Opioids and Needless Pain, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 2002.
34See Barry Meier, Pain Killer, 50 (2003).
35See Ben Rich, A Prescription for the Pain: The Emerging Standard of Care for Pain Management, 26 Wm. Mitchell L.
Rev. 1, 13 (2000).
8Administration is at, or near, the top, of the list of explanatory factors.36
The state and federal law surrounding the prescription of controlled substances by physicians will be discussed
later in this paper, but it is worth noting at this point that a large number of the most eﬀective medications
for treating chronic and end-of-life pain are highly regulated by the federal and state governments because of
their high potential for addiction and abuse. Being disciplined by a state medical board, or even just being
investigated, can result in professional embarrassment among ones peers, the loss of institutional privileges,
the loss of access to insurance or the loss of one’s license.37
As a result of a number of high proﬁle cases and law enforcement eﬀorts (that are discussed later in the
paper) that targeted physicians for the illegal distribution of such drugs, many physicians fear, regardless of
whether they are prescribing for an accepted and legitimate medical purpose, that they will be investigated
for possible illegal diversion or physician-assisted suicide if they prescribe large amounts regulated drugs. The
subjective nature of pain and the diﬃculty of providing objective proof of the actual existence of legitimate
pain reinforce the fear that physicians could expose themselves to disciplinary or criminal actions even if
their course of treatment seemed appropriate and medically reasonable at the time pain medication was
prescribed. Jacob Sullum perhaps put the dilemma faced by physicians best:
How do you prove the existence of migrane headaches or back pain, not to mention
poorly understood conditions such as ﬁbromyalgia and chronic fatigue syndrome?
A doctor can take a patient’s history, inquire about symptoms, and perform an
exam. He can consider the patient’s character and reputation. But in the end, he
is only surmising that the pain is real. Ultimately, he has to take the patients at
his word, knowing that misplaced trust could mean professional ruin. 38
36See S. Johnson, Disciplinary Actions and Pain Relief: Analysis of the Pain Relief Act, 24 J.L. Med. & Ethics, 320
(1996); Ann Alpers, Criminal Act or Palliative Care? Prosecutions Involving the Care of the Dying, 26 J.L. Med & Ethics
308 (1998); Ann M. Martino, In Search of a New Ethic for Treating Patients with Chronic Pain: What Can Medical Boards Do?,
26 J.L. Med. & Ethics, 332, 332 (1998); Russell K. Portenoy, Opioid Therapy for Chronic Nonmalignant Pain: Clinicians’
Perspective, 24 J.L. Med. & Ethics 296, (1996); C.S. Hill, The Negative Inﬂuence of Licensing and Disciplinary Boards and
Drug Enforcement Agencies in Pain with Opioid Analgesics, 1 J. of Pharm. Care in Pain and Symptom Control, 43 (1993)
37See Ann M. Martino, In Search of a New Ethic for Treating Patients With Chronic Pain: What Can Medical Boards Do?,
26 J.L. Med. & Ethics, 332, 334 (1998).
9Recent studies conﬁrm physician fears. A survey of physicians in Texas found that more than 26% of
respondents believed that prescribing narcotics for patients in pain would trigger an investigation by a drug
enforcement agency.39 A 1991 study of Wisconsin physicians indicated that 54% of respondents prescribed
a diﬀerent schedule of drug, lowered the dose, decreased the quantity or limited reﬁlls of opioid prescriptions
when concerned about a possible regulatory investigation.40 When treating patients at the end of life,
physicians also fear that investigators may misperceive the aggressive treatment of pain as physician-assisted
suicide.41 One physician described their perspective as follows:
Chronic pain patients are diﬃcult enough to treat without having to worry about
‘big brother’ looking over your shoulder. The DEA, the boards...[they] don’t trust
doctors to be able to distinguish between a patient who needs medication for pain
and a patient who is seeking drugs. I resent it and I’m not about to jeopardize my
livelihood because of it. I refer almost all of my pain patients these days.42
Some argue that these regulatory fears are reinforced by requirements in some states that physicians use trip-
licate prescription forms43 for any prescription of a controlled substance.44 Opponents of such requirements
argue that they deter the adequate treatment of pain because physician fears that large prescriptions for pain
relieving medication – even if well within medically appropriate levels – will trigger scrutiny from oﬃcials.45
Furthermore, many doctors may simply avoid the trouble of navigating the paperwork and risking scrutiny
for their use.46 A study conducted of California doctors – a state that has required triplicate prescriptions –
39See Sharon M. Weinstein et al., Physicians’ Attitudes Toward Pain and the Use of Opioid Analgesics: Results from a
Survey from the Texas Cancer Pain Initiative, 93 South Med. J. 479, 479-87 (2000).
40See David E. Joranson et al., Wisconsin Physicians’ Knowledge and Attitudes About Opioid Analgesic Regulations, 90
Wis. Med. J. 671, 675 (1991). (available at http://www.medsch.wisc.edu/painpolicy/publicat/91wmj.htm).
41See Nicholas P. Lovrich, Jr. & Stephen J. Ziegler, Pain Relief, Prescription Drugs, and Prosecution: A Four-State Survey
of Chief Prosecutors, 31 J.L. Med. & Ethics 75, 76 (2003); See also Arthur Caplan & David Orentlicher, The Pain Relief
Promotion Act of 1999: A Serious Threat to Palliative Care, 283 JAMA, 255, 255-58 (2000).
43Such regulations require prescriptions for Schedule II drugs to be written on multiple copy forms with one copy going to
the doctor, one to the patient (who brings it to the pharmacy, and the ﬁnal copy going to the state). See Sullum supra 36.
44See Kathryn L. Tucker, A New Risk Emerges: Provider Accountability for Inadequate Treatment of Pain, 9 Annals of
Long-Term Care 52, 52 (2001).
45Id.
46See David E. Weissman, Pain Management and the Bogeyman, Healthlink (2001) (available at:
http://healthlink.mcw.edu/article/1007067408.html (explaining how physicians in California taught residents in training
to avoid registering for triplicate prescription pads to avoid regulatory scrutiny).
10found that only 60% of physicians were authorized to write triplicate prescriptions, and of those, only 40%
actually did.47 Many states are now considering moving, or have moved, to electronic prescription moni-
toring programs in response to the recent rise in prescription drug abuse.48 Some believe this will alleviate
many of the problems of deterrence while other remain skeptical of the improvement they will bring.49 The
value of electronic monitoring to curb prescription drug abuse will be discussed in the ﬁnal section of this
paper.
2.
Failure of Medical Education – The Dominance of the Curative Approach
Perhaps more troubling than the fear of regulatory scrutiny – a cause that could, at least theoretically, be
rectiﬁed with a change in governmental policy – are the problems within the culture of medicine itself that
contribute to epidemic of undertreatment. More troubling because even if many of the various proposals
for regulatory and legal reform were adopted, it is still possible that real change for patients would not be
forthcoming.
At the root of the critique of the medical profession’s contribution to the undertreatment is an attack on
the dominance of the curative, rather than palliative, approach to patient care, even in situations where
a curative approach is not appropriate.50 For patients suﬀering from chronic pain—pain that does not
necessarily have an underlying curable disease as its cause—or terminal illness, this diﬀerence in priorities
can have severe consequences.51 Ben Rich explains the problem facing patients with chronic or end-of-life
47See Damien Cave, No Relief, Salon.com, Apr. 4, 2002 (available at http://www.salon.com/mwt/feature/2002/04/04/no relief/).
48See Michael Janofsky, Drug-Fighters Turn to Rising Tide of Prescription Abuse, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18 2004.
49See Tucker supra note 41.
50See Rich supra note 11 at 21-25.
51See Martino supra note 36.
11pain when they encounter a curative-based medical culture:
The all-too-common response of caregivers to the patients is to label such patient’s requests
for more eﬀective medications as “drug-seeking” or addictive behaviors, and their protestations
of physically disabling pain as “malingering.” The haste with which some caregivers dismiss
or diminish patient complaints about pain suggests not only an ambivalence toward the pain
experience of others, but a more fundamental quandary about the place of pain in human
experience. The prevailing curative model of medicine is not only hostile to eﬀective care of
chronic pain patients, but to patients with terminal illness as well.52
The SUPPORT study, discussed brieﬂy earlier, also provides insight into the dominance of the curative
approach, at least among some physicians.53 In that study, nearly 40% of advance directives were ignored
and more than 50% of patients were left in pain in their ﬁnal days of life. In that stage of life, one would
hope that the focus would be on the relief of suﬀering and respect for the wishes of the patient rather
than an attempt to conquer an underlying disease, but that is too often not the case. Unfortunately, such
care requires a humanistic, empathetic and interpersonal approach toward medicine that is tailored to the
individual patient as much as it does any scientiﬁc or technological skill – a skill far too often lacking
in physicians entrusted with the care of those in pain.54 A quarter of recent medical school graduates
said that the primary goal of medicine was to cure disease rather than relief of suﬀering was the primary
pursuit of medicine.55 In 1997, the Institute of Medicine published a report that concluded: “deﬁciencies in
undergraduate, graduate, and continuing education for end-of-life care reﬂect a medical culture that deﬁnes
death as failure and ignores care for dying people as a source of professional accomplishment and personal
meaning.”56
53See supra note 6.
54See Rich supra 11 at 24; See also Melanie Thernstrom, The Writing Cure, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 2004. (explaining the
importance of narrative in medical care).
55See Association of American Medical Colleges, 2003 Medical School Graduation Questionaire, All Schools
Report (2003).
56Committee On Care At The End Of Life, Institute Of Medicine, Approaching Death: Improving Care At The
End Of Life (1997); See also Beth P. Weinman, Freedom From Pain: Establishing a Constitutional Right to Pain Relief, 24
J. Legal Med. 495, 517-18 (2003).
12Explanations for such an approach can be found in medical school curriculums – curriculums that still do
not seem to take pain relief and palliative care seriously. Only four out of a surveyed 125 medical schools
required a pain management course for graduation in 2001, and only 40 oﬀered a separate elective course
on the subject.57 Tufts University is currently in the only medical school in the country that oﬀers a
multidisciplinary postgraduate pain management program of study in pain medicine.58
Not surprisingly, the result of the lack of formal training has been that new doctors often feel as if they lack
adequate training for treating pain. A recent study found that almost 48% of 14,000 recent medical school
graduates believed that their pain management training was inadequate.59 Another survey found that fewer
than 18% of medical students indicated that they received some sort of formal end-of-life training at all
in medical school.60 Studies also indicate that graduating medical students are “eager for more training”
in care for the dying.61 As will be discussed in the ﬁnal parts of this paper, this failure of out nation’s
educational institutions has had devastating ramiﬁcations not only for pain patients who are unable to ﬁnd
physicians to provide adequate care, but also for society as a whole who must cope with a prescription drug
abuse problem that is partially fostered by physicians who are inadequately trained at administering opioid
painkillers and identifying potential abusers.62
3. Failure of Medical Education – Opiophobia
57See Association of American Medical Colleges, 2003 Medical School Graduation Questionaire, All Schools
Report (2003).
58See http://www.tufts.edu/med/prep/index.html
59See Association of American Medical Colleges, 2003 Medical School Graduation Questionaire, All Schools
Report (2003). The good news is that progress is being made – the same study found that 56.1% of surveyed students believed
that their pain education management training was inadequate just two years earlier in 2001.
60See Dana-Farber Cancer Instittue Press Release, Oct. 29, 2003 (available at:
http://www.dana-farber.org/abo/news/press/102903.asp).
61See J. Andrew Billings & Susan Block, Palliative Care in Undergraduate Medical Education: Status Report and Future
Directions, 278 JAMA 733, 734 (1997).
62See infra Section IV & V.
13Tied to the attack on the dominance of the curative model is the charge that a majority of the medical
profession signiﬁcantly overestimates opiates’ potential for addiction and serious side-eﬀects, while at the
same time underestimating their potential for positive good for patients in chronic pain and pain at the end
of life. For those in the pain relief community, the preferred term for this phenomenom is “opiophobia.”63
The result, it is argued, is that patients who could beneﬁt greatly from opioids are denied valuable treatment
simply because of mistaken assumptions.64
For advocates of the use of opioids for chronic pain, at heart of opiophobia is the deeply held, yet mistaken,
fear that long-term exposure to opioids creates an addiction risk that outweighs any potential gains that
result from using opioid analgesics.65 The roots of such fear stretch back more than a hundred years when
large numbers of Civil War veterans became addicted to morphine.66 It started to become a major issue
in American medicine starting in the 1890’s.67 At that time, still unregulated, opiates were prescribed for
a wide range of problems, ranging from menstrual cramps to anxiety – heroin was marketed as a cough
remedy.68 As addiction spread among working class young men and middle-class housewives69, physicians
quickly became the target of blame.70 In 1919, doctors began to be prosecuted by the federal government
for creating and treating opiate addicts.71 By the mid-1920’s physicians became increasingly wary of using
opiates or treating patients who had previously become addicted and many were forced into an underground
63See Beth P. Weinman, Freedom From Pain: Establishing a Constitutional Right to Pain Relief, 24 J. Legal Med. 495,
515-16 (2003) (“Opiophobia is the fear of prescribing or taking opioids due to an overestimation of the potential for addiction”);
64See Damien Cave, No Relief, Salon.com, Apr. 4, 2002 (quoting Barbara Coombs-Lee, President of Compassion in Dying:
“We are an opiophobic nation....We have a craziness about this issue and the eﬀect is that it harms patients in pain and those
at the end of their life).
65See Rich supra at 20.
66See Jacob Sullum, No Relief in Sight, Reason (1997).
67See Caroline Jean Acker, Creating the American Junkie, 1 (2002).
68Id. at 1-2.
69See Meier supra note 13 at 57 (“Around 1900 there were an estimated three hundred thousand morphine addicts in the
United States”).
70Id.
71Id. at 35-36.
14drug culture to ﬁnd relief.72 The emphasis on the “War on Drugs” over the last twenty years and the rise
of prescription drug abuse has only contributed to this general sense that all uses of potentially addictive
drugs are “dangerous.”73
Rather than being a source of addiction and destruction, advocates argue that the risk of addiction with
properly administered opiate analgesics is actually minimal.74 As Dr. Sidney Schnoll, the Chairman of the
Division of Substance Abuse Medicine at the Medical College of Virginia puts it:
We will go to great lengths to stop addiction—which, though certainly a problem, is dwarfed by the
number of people who do not get adequate pain relief. So we will cause countless people to suﬀer in
an eﬀort to stop a few cases of addiction. I ﬁnd that appalling.75
Even institutions such as the National Institute on Drug Abuse, an organization particularly attuned to
the risk of drug abuse, acknowledge that fears of addiction tied to opiates in the pain context have had
dangerous consequences.76 Further, some argue that the eﬀect of substituting supposedly “safer” drugs such
as anti-inﬂammatory drugs like asprin can have even more severe health consequences.77 Others contend
that, in many cases, opiates can be administered safely to even to patients with a history of drug abuse.78
For people with severe chronic pain, opiophobia produces the diﬃcult obstacle of ﬁnding physicians who are
willing to prescribe what is sometimes the only drug that will adequately treat their pain because under-
trained doctors and pharmacists often mistake a pain patient’s desperate search for pain relief as illegitimate
72Id. at 62-63.
73See Weinman supra note 55 at 514-515.
74See id.; See also Russell K. Portenoy, Opioid Therapy for Chronic Nonmalignant Pain: Current Status, 1 Prog. Pain
Res. & Mgmt. 247, 263 (1994); Jane Porter & Hershel Jick, Addiction Rare in Patients Treated with Narcotics, 302 New
Eng. J. Med., 123, 123 (1999).
76Id. (quote from NIDA Director Charles Schuster in 1989: “We have been so eﬀective in warning the medical establishment
and the public in general about the inappropriate use of opiates that we have endowed these drugs with a mysterious power to
enslave that is overrated.”).
77See supra note 5 (“According to the Federal Drug Abuse Warning Network, anti-inﬂammatory drugs (including asprin and
Aleve) were implicated in the deaths of 16,000 people in 2000 because of bleeding ulcers and related complications.); See also
Jane Spencer, Crackdown on Drugs Hits Chronic-Pain Patients, Wall St. J, Mar. 16, 2004 (citing physician concerns about
the health impact of shifting pain patients to over-the-counter drugs).
78See Martino supra 36 at 333.
15or illegal drug-seeking behavior.79 The result is that many patients ﬁnd themselves both in pain and with
the stigma of being a “druggie” once they ﬁnally do ﬁnd a doctor willing to prescribe.80 The stigma often
extends to all aspects of an opiate users life. As one patient described her experience with opioids that were
prescribed to treat chronic back pain:
When I realized that without the medication I could not function, I felt like a “druggie”...no
better than a crack-head. My husband pleaded with me to stop [taking the prescribed
medication] for the sake of our family....He harassed me and the doctor. I was forbidden
to metion that I took the drugs even to my closest friends. After a while, I started to act
like a drug addict. I hid my medications from him and from everyone else. I drove miles to
have my prescriptions ﬁlled at drugstores where no one knew me. NO one ever explained
to me that it was ‘okay’ to need my medications...that needing drugs to take away pain is
diﬀerent [from] being a druggie. So I stopeed and the pain nearly killed me. I wanted to
start up again, but the doctor who treated me before said no, not after all the trouble, even
though I got divorced....He [the doctor] was afraid I’d lose him his prescribing [privileges].81
The tragic result of such stigma is that legitimate pain patients themselves and their families often become
signiﬁcant obstacles to their own eﬀective treatment.
4. Societal Attitudes Toward Pain
The West’s, and speciﬁcally the American, cultural view toward pain and suﬀering also certainly plays some
role in the undertreatment of pain – though it is a topic that could likely make an entire paper in itself.82
For the purposes of this venture it is necessary to only outline some of the major cultural factors to consider
as one seeks to evaluate and form policy. One such factor is the role of suﬀering in major religions, including,
79See id. at 336.
80See Josh White, Painkiller a Headache for Police, Wash. Post, May 2, 2001 (tells patient story who indicates that
pharmacists treat him like an “illicit drug user” when he ﬁlls his OxyContin prescription); Linda Mars, OxyContin Abuse May
Curb Progress in Pain Field, L.A. Times, Aug. 31, 2001 (patient who was received treatment in the ER because she used
opiate pain killers prescribed by her doctor); Carolyn Kleiner, A Curse and a Cure, U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 6,
2001 (patient who had prescription refused by doctor even when conﬁrmed that it was legitimate and who had to visit 10
pharmacies before ﬁnding one that would ﬁnally ﬁll it).
82See Rich supra note 11 (laying out an extensive overview of the intersection of pain tolerance and western religious and
cultural inﬂuences).
16most notably, Christianity.83 Another is the role of toughness in America’s concept of “manhood” – from
sports to war, there have always been examples of the linkage between the ability to withstand pain without
complaint and virtue.84 To the extent such cultural factors play a role in the undertreatment, they act
through both patients who do not notify their physician to pain or through a concept of medicine that sees
pain as more of a complaint than a legitimate medical disease. Because these factors are so deep rooted
where they are present, they are likely the least likely to be substantially aﬀected by policy change, at least
in the short term.
5. Insurance Pressure
As is the case with almost every issue in health care today, money also plays a role in the provision of
adequate pain relief. First and foremost, the lack of insurance for millions of Americans is a major obstacle
to treatment of any sort of pain, let alone chronic or end-of-life pain – as eﬀective pain treatment requires
not only doctor’s visits, but also sometimes expensive medication.85 Even with insurance, the subjective
nature of pain combined with the time and cost involved in treatment make it an easy target for cost-saving
measures.86 Additional complications arise when the bureaucratic requirements of Medicare and Medicaid
are brought into play.87
c. The Pain Relief Movement
To understand the current policy challenges of undertreatment it is necessary to understand the history of
83See id.; See also Weinman supra note 55 at 519.
84See Weinman supra note 55 at 519.
85See id. at 519-520; See also Martino supra 36 at 335.
86See Cave supra note 62. (quoting Daniel Carr, founding medical director of the pain management program at Tufts:
“Anything that looks like it will take more time is a tremendous disincentive).
87See Weinman supra note 55 at 520.
17the pain relief movement. For the future policy maker it serves a number of valuable purposes. First, it
provides an account of how past policy and regulation failed, and how a small group of physicians were
able to move the medical community toward today’s emerging pain relief consensus. Second, it provides a
foundation to understand how that consensus both partially contributed to the current policy crisis and how
it also provides an essential foundation for any policy regime of the future.
The problem of chronic pain and pain at the end of life is not a novel phenomenon – it has existed as long
as humankind itself. It is only recently, however, that policy makers and doctors have recognized it as a
major policy challenge that can no longer be ignored. A large share of the credit for this shift goes to the
eﬀorts of a small group of dedicated physicians who have worked tirelessly for the last quarter-century to
both advance pain treatment methods and to raise the proﬁle of those suﬀering from treatable pain.88
Many consider the ﬁrst major modern article to be published on the problem of undertreatment of pain to be
a 1973 article by psychiatrists Richard Marks and Edward Sachar.89 Assigned to study “diﬃcult” patients
in a number of New York hospitals, they concluded that the primary reason for continued pain complaints
among patients being treated with narcotics was not psychological, but rather because the physicians in
charge of caring for them were unaware of proper dosage amounts and overestimated risks of addiction.90
Marks and Sachar came to the following conclusion with regard to the use of opioids to treat pain: “For
88Though certainly not meant to be exhaustive, three of the most prominent leaders in this movement have been Dr. Kathleen
Foley (Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center), Dr. Russell Portenoy (Chairman of the Department of Pain Medicine and
Palliative Care at Beth Israel Medical Center), and Dr. Daniel Carr (Tufts School of Medicine).
89See Richard M. Marks & Edward J. Sachar, Undertreatment of Medical Inpatients with Narcotic Analgesics, 78 Annals
Internal Med. 173, 173-81 (1973); see also Rich supra note 11 at 8.
90See Marks at 174-80.
18many physicians these drugs may have a special emotional signiﬁcance that interferes with their rational
use.”91 Such a refrain would become standard among pain relief experts in the decades to follow.92
It was not until the early 1980’s, however, that real progress started to be made at the level of the patient.
In 1981 the Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York City became the ﬁrst hospital in the United States
to open a unit speciﬁcally dedicated to the treatment of pain.93 Among the most important contributions
to come of this new eﬀort at Sloan-Kettering was the discovery that cancer patients in pain could be given
constant doses of morphine rather than waiting for patients to request it – thus stabilizing its pain relief
eﬀects and avoiding the roller-coaster eﬀect on the patient.94 To most expert’s surprise at the time, the new
method improved pain treatment and did not create any additional risk of addiction or euphoric high.95
Though the eﬀorts at Sloan-Kettering were making progress in the use of opioids to treat cancer pain, the
question of opioids being used for the treatment of chronic pain was still very much an open question. Many in
the medical establishment were against their use with chronic pain patients, fearing the narcotics could lead
to abuse, addiction, rebound pain and loss of awareness.96 For the overwhelming of chronic pain patients,
the only options for treatment were pain clinics that taught them how to “live with the pain.”97 Treatments
included hypnosis, physical therapy, counseling, expensive diagnostic tests, and surgery.98 Though the
surgery, often a last resort, was intended to relieve pain, in far too many cases it ended up making their pain
worse.99 In general, a large portion of the population suﬀering from chronic pain did not ﬁnd relief that
91See id. at 180; See also Sullum supra note 38 (for further discussion of the Marks and Sachar article).
92See Brody supra note 33 (quoting Dr. Henry McQuay, professor of pain relief at Oxford University: “Opioids are our most
powerful analgesics, but politics, prejudice and our continuing ignorance still impede optimum prescribing. What happens when
opioids are given to someone in pain is diﬀerent from what happens when they are given to someone not in pain. The medical
use of opioids does not create drug addicts, and restrictions on this medical use hurt patients.”).
93See Meier supra note 13 at 63.
94See id. at 59.
95See id. at 60.
96See id. at 61.
97See Jane M. Orient, Testimony at House Oﬃce Building (Dec. 16, 2003) (available at
http://www.aapsonline.org/painman/paindocs.htm).
98Id.
99Id.
19allowed them to return to their previous quality of life.100
In 1986, however, Russell Portenoy and Kathleen Foley published a groundbreaking study in the journal Pain
in which they argued that the long-term use of opioids was eﬀective in treating intractable pain and safe for
those with no history of drug abuse.101 This article sparked a debate about the dangers of opioid addiction
that would later become central to federal and state policies directed at the regulation of prescription pain
relief medication such as OxyContin.
Though the Portenoy and Foley piece was focused directly on the question of opioid use for chronic pain
patients, there were other articles that were written in the same time period that would also become the
focus of the OxyContin and surrounding policy debates. The ﬁrst was a 1977 study of headache suﬀerers
that found only three patients out of 2,369 developed addiction problems after being treated with opioids.102
Another study, issued in 1980, found similar results in a study looking at hospital patients – in that survey,
only four out of 11,882 patients developed an addiction problem.103 Together, these studies would form the
basis of a claim, later challenged by some, that the threat of addiction was minor for opiate treatment for
chronic pain patients who had no history of abuse.104
By 1989, the message of opioid treatment for chronic pain began to gain traction, and Texas became the ﬁrst
100Id.
101See Russell K. Portenoy & Kathleen M. Foley, Chronic Use of Opioid Analgesics in Non-Malignant Pain, 25 Pain 171,
171-186 (1986).
102See Seymour Diamond & Jose L. Medina, Drug Dependency in Patients with Chronic Headaches, 17 Headache 12, 12-14
(1977).
103See Herschel Jick & Jane Porter, Addiction Rare in Patients Treated with Narcotics, 302 New Engl. J. Med. 123 (1980).
104See Meier supra note 13 at 67.
20state to pass an Intractable Pain Treatment Act.105 For the ﬁrst time, medical board guidelines speciﬁcally
recognized the role of opioids in treating chronic pain. At the same time, critics of the undertreatment of
pain continued to sound the alarm that the medical profession itself was continuing to provide inadequate
relief. In an article written the same year that Texas passed its Intractable Pain Act, Kathleen Foley, the
founding director of Sloan-Kettering’s pain treatment unit, declared that “most physicians lack suﬃcient
knowledge of the clinical pharmacological approaches” necessary to treat chronic pain eﬀectively.106 This
combination of an undereducated medical community and an increasingly liberalized view toward the routine
use of opioid analgesics in the treatment of chronic pain is at the root of the policy problem surrounding
the explosion of prescription drug abuse that is currently ravaging much of the country (and that will be
discussed in the following sections of the paper).
II.
The Other Problem – The Epidemic of Prescription Drug Abuse
As was alluded to earlier, ﬁnding a solution to the “epidemic”107 of the undertreatment of pain is made
inﬁnitely more diﬃcult by the worsening crisis of the related “epidemic”108 of prescription drug abuse.
Though the specter of abuse and diversion has always clouded the expansion in the use of opiates to treat
pain, the growth in prescription drug abuse over the last ﬁve years, led by the explosion in OxyContin use, has
105See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. Art. 4495c (Vernon 2001) (adopted by Acts 1989, 71st leg., 1st C.S., ch. 5, §1, eﬀ. Nov. 1,
1989) (§5 reads as follows: “No physician may be subject to disciplinary action by the board for prescribing or administering
dangerous drugs or controlled substances in the course of treatment of a person for intractable pain.”); See also Meier supra
note 13 at 69.
106See Kathleen M. Foley, The “Decriminalization” of Cancer Pain, 11 Adv. Pain Res. & Therapy 5, 15 (1989); See also
Rich supra note 20 (discussing the Foley article in the context of other writing on pain at the time).
107See White supra note 25 (quoting Russell Portenoy: “There is an epidemic of chronic pain in the United States.”).
108See Sandra Blakeslee, Drug Makers Hope to Kill the Kick in Pain Relief, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 2004 (quoting Dr. Cliﬀord
Woolf of Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School on the rise of prescription drug abuse: “No other drug
type in the last 20 years had been so abused in such a short period of time....It’s an epidemic.”)
21changed the issue dramatically.109 If further progress is to be made in the battle against the undertreatment
of pain, advocates of opiate availability must confront head on the problems presented by OxyContin abuse
and diversion.
a. Prescription Drug Abuse Overall
Surging numbers of abuse, combined with increased media coverage and a number of high proﬁle celebrity
bouts of addiction110 have made prescription drug abuse a major national policy issue. Just this year,
prescription drugs overtook amphetamines as the second most abused drug in the country.111 According to
the National Survey on Drug Use and Health, 6.2 million people, or 2.6% of the U.S. population over the age
of 12, abused prescription drugs in 2001.112 Of those, 4.4 million abused pain relievers.113 By comparison,
2 million Americans were found to abuse cocaine and 14.6 million to abuse marijuana.114 Emergency room
visits that can be tied to the non-medical use of prescription painkillers doubled between 1994 and 2001.115
Hydrocodone-related visits—a painkiller prescribed more than 100 million times in 2003—nearly doubled on
its own between 1998 and 2001.116
109See Barry Meier, The Delicate Balance of Pain and Addiction, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 2003.
110See Jill Barton, Doctor Shopping, Drug Use Reported in Limbaugh Raid, Houston Chronicle, Dec. 5, 2003 (detailing
charges against radio talk show superstar Rush Limbaugh for alleged illegal drug use); See also Rebekah Denn, Love’s Antics
Cost Her Custody of Daughter, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Oct. 18, 2003 (discussing rock star Courtney Love’s problems
with OxyContin); Michael Starr, Jack Hooked on OxyContin, N.Y. Post, Jul. 3, 2003 (proﬁling television star’s (and son of
Ozzy Osbourne) battle with OxyContin addiction).
111See Michael Janofsky, Drug-Fighters Turn to Rising Tide of Prescription Abuse, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 2004.
112See 2002 National Survey on Drug Use and Health, Department of Health and Human Services (2002) (overview
available at: http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda/2k2nsduh/Overview/2k2Overview.htm#toc)
113Id.
114Id.
115Id.
116See Marc Kaufman, U.S. is Working to Make Painkillers Harder to Obtain, Wash. Post, Feb. 15, 2004. (DEA oﬃcials
are currently pushing to have hydrocodone re-classiﬁed as Schedule II, the same regulatory category as OxyContin).
22Of particular concern, abuse of painkillers is on the rise amongst teens. In 2002, 11.2% of teenagers reported
using prescription pain relievers for non-medical reasons at least once.117 This is up from 9.6% in just 2001
and 1.2% in 1989.118 This rise in abuse among teens comes at the same time that use of other illicit drugs
by 8th, 10th and 12th graders has dropped by 11%.119
The spread among teens and others is facilitated by the wide availability of such prescription drugs through
illegal websites.120 A recent study by the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia
University found 157 Internet sites selling prescription drugs.121 Of those sites, 90% did not require a
prescription.122 Drugs available on these sites included OxyContin, Valium, Ritalin and Adderall.123
This spring, in response to the growing problem the Bush administration, for the ﬁrst time, announced the
formation of a coordinated drug strategy to confront prescription drug abuse.124
b. The Rise of OxyContin
Though prescription drug abuse broadly deﬁned is a major policy challenge, there is one drug in particular
– OxyContin – that deserves special attention, as its unique qualities both pose substantial risks and sub-
stantial potential for beneﬁts to millions of Americans. It is a drug that both oﬀers the hope of signiﬁcant
progress in the battle against undertreatment of pain and creates incredible concern as its abuse carries
the potential of destroying lives and communities all over the country. Because it lies at the intersection
117Id.
118Id.
119See Janofsky supra note 111.
120See Marc Kaufman, Crackdown on Prescription Abuse, Wash. Post, Mar. 2, 2004.
121See National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, ‘You’ve Got
Drugs!’: Prescription Drug Pushers on the Internet, A CASA White Paper (2004) (available at:
http://www.casacolumbia.org/pdshopprov/shop/item.asp?itemid=61).
122Id.
123Id.
124See Office of National Drug Control Policy, U.S. Drug Prevention, Treatment, En-
forcement Agencies Take on “Doctor Shoppers,” “Pill Mills,” Mar. 1, 2004 (available at:
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/press04/030104.html).
23of the national debate over drug abuse and pain relief, the resolution of the policy challenges surrounding
OxyContin will determine the course of progress in pain relief for the decade to come. To properly evaluate
the policy options that the OxyContin debate oﬀers, however, it is ﬁrst necessary to outline the framework
of the dilemma that it presents.
1.
The Beneﬁts of OxyContin
OxyContin’s primary active ingredient is oxycodone—a synthetic opiate developed in a Germany laboratory
in 1916125—and it has been used extensively in the United States for more than ﬁfty years.126 When used
in a medical context, oxycodone is considered an eﬀective treatment for mild to moderate pain control,
chronic pain syndromes, and the treatment of cancer pain.127 Over the years, a number of oxycodone-based
painkillers have been approved by the FDA, including Percodan, Percocet, MS Contin and Tylox.128 It is
estimated that oxycodone is twice as potent as morphine, another frequently prescribed pain relief drug.129
When approved by the FDA in 1995, OxyContin was thought to be a breakthrough drug for three primary
reasons. First, like previous oxycodone painkillers, OxyContin also had the advantage of not containing
acetaminophen or asprin – thus avoiding their potentially damaging eﬀects on the liver.130
Second, unlike its oxycodone predecessors, OxyContin oﬀered 12 hours of constant relief with one pill, as
opposed to four hours with previous options.131 In order to deliver enough drugs for a full 12-hour period,
125See Paul Tough, The Alchemy of OxyContin, N.Y. Times Magazine, Jul. 29, 2001.
126See Meier supra note 12 at 81-82 (the ﬁrst drug sold using oxycodone was Percodan, a combination of oxycodone and
asprin, introduced around 1950).
127See Laura M. Nagel & Patricia M. Good, Oxycodone, DEA-Industry Communicator, OxyContin Special (2001)
(available at: http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/nwslttr/spec2001/oxy spec.pdf).
128See id. at 12.
129See G.B. Curtis, et al., Relative Potency of Controlled-Release Oxycodone and Morphine in a Postoperative Pain Model,
European Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, vol. 55, no. 6 (1999): 55:425-429.
130See Claudia Kalb, Playing with Pain Killers, Newsweek, Apr. 9, 2001.
131See Weinman supra note 56 at 498; See also Debra E. Heidrich, Controlled-Release OxyCodone Hydrochlorine (OxyContin),
24however, each pill contains signiﬁcantly more oxycodone than the Percocet or Percodan.132 This enabled
those suﬀering from serious pain to have a full night’s sleep for the ﬁrst time and it avoided the discomfort of
patients having to wait for relief with each new dose.133 Purdue Pharma, the manufacturer of OxyContin,
was able to achieve this by putting high doses of oxycodone into a single pill with a built-in time-release
mechanism that slowly delivered constant doses throughout the 12-hour time period it was active.134
This mechanism was also at the root of its third claim to innovation, which was that its time-release function
would make it an unattractive candidate for abuse as those seeking to abuse the drug would not be interested
in a drug that distributed its eﬀect slowly over a long-period of time without an immediate euphoric eﬀect.135
In connection with that theory, the FDA approved labeling in late 1995 that provided: “Delayed absorption,
as provided by OxyContin tablets, is believed to reduce the abuse liability of a drug.”136
Though the ﬁrst claim – concerning the beneﬁts of OxyContin for pain patients – would prove true, this
second claim would turn out to be tragically mistaken. Within a few years of its introduction, abusers
soon discovered that grinding up the pills would allow them to bypass the time-release mechanism and gain
instant access to incredibly high doses of oxycodone.137 According to oﬃcials familiar with opiate addiction,
the same method of crushing up tablets for either injection or to be snorted has been used for abusing Per-
cocet, Percodan and Tylox for years.138 Why this was not raised as a red ﬂag earlier in the process, by the
15 Clin. Nurse Specialist 207, 207 (2001) (explaining that the 12 hour dose of OxyContin enables people to live a more
normal life and carries fewer side eﬀects than morphine).
132OxyContin is currently available in 10, 20, 40, and 80-milligram strengths. A 160-milligram was introduced in 2000, but
was later withdrawn by Purdue because of abuse concerns in May 2001. By comparison, Percocet contains 5 milligrams of
oxycodone, and Percodan 4.5 milligrams. See DEA, Drug Intelligence Brief, OxyContin: Pharmaceutical Diversion
(2002).
133See Meier supra note 12 at 84.
134See Heidrich supra note 127 at 207; See also Meier supra note 12 at 81 (“...company scientists went back to the drawing
board, eventually coming up with a new timed-release system for OxyContin that used a synthetic acrylic, rather than wax, as
the basis of the tablet. The design provided a quick burst of oxycodone for pain relief as the pill’s outer coating dissolved in
the stomach. Then, as it moved from the stomach into the intestines, the acrylic tablet continued to release a steady supply of
the drug over twelve hours.”).
135See Meier supra note 12 at 85-86.
136See id. at 87.
137See Timothy Roche, The Potent Perils of a Miracle Drug, Time, Jan. 8, 2001.
138See John Burke, OxyContin – A Sense of Balance, DEA-Industry Communicator, OxyContin Special (2001)
(available at: http://www.deadiversion.usdoj.gov/pubs/nwslttr/spec2001/oxy spec.pdf).
25manufacturer Purdue, the FDA or the DEA would be a question ﬁercely debated in the years to come.139
Regardless of its problems on the street, OxyContin has been an enormous ﬁnancial success for Purdue
Pharma. While prescriptions totaled 300,000 in1995, the ﬁrst year of OxyContin was on the market, they
had grown to over 5.8 million ﬁve years later in 2000.140 Even amid the growing media ﬁrestorm surrounding
the OxyContin abuse, sales continued to soar. In 2002 alone, Purdue made $4.67 billion from OxyContin,
up 18% from its 2001 sales, and up 136% from 1998.141 By 2000, OxyContin was both the most widely
prescribed Schedule II drug in the country142 and the most abused.143
2.
The Scope of the Problem
Reports of serious abuse of OxyContin began to gain signiﬁcant attention in both the media and in regulatory
circles in the fall of 2000.144 Abusers had begun injecting, chewing and snorting OxyContin to gain euphoric
highs and to avoid withdrawal symptoms from heroin.145 Recent reports from New York indicate that
college students have begun to ingest OxyContin by putting it in a shot glass, pouring boiling water over it
to dissolve the ingredients and then drinking it like a shot.146
The hardest hit areas were also the ﬁrst to report abuse and included rural Maine, western Pennsylvania,
and the Appalachian areas of Virginia, West Virginia, and Kentucky.147 The problem, however, has since
139See GAO, Prescription Drugs: OxyContin Abuse and Diversion and Efforts to Address the Problem (December
2003).
140See Rubin supra note 1.
141See Anna Wilde Mathews & Gary Fields, Federal Agencies Seek to Curb Abuse of Potent Painkillers, Wall St. J., Dec.
3, 2003.
142See DEA supra note 131.
143See Ralph Vartabedian, Painful Rift Unnerves Doctors, L.A. Times, Oct. 20, 2003.
144See Meier supra not 12 at 42-48.
145See DEA supra note 131.
146See Matthew Sweeney & Philip Messing, Upscale Junkies – White Collar Abuse of OxyContin Skyrockets, N.Y. Post, Feb.
16, 2004.
147See Tough supra note 125.
26expanded nationwide, with some of the newest hard hit areas including Louisiana, Ohio, Arizona, and a
number of urban areas.148 By 2001, drug treatment programs in these regions were reporting that 30
to 90 percent of newly admitted patients cited OxyContin as their primary drug of abuse.149 Between
1996 and 2000, emergency room admissions related to OxyContin tripled from 3,190 to 10,825.150 In the
New York metropolitan area alone, emergency room visits increased by more than 140% between 2000 and
2002.151 One former sheriﬀ in Hazard, Kentucky described the impact on his community as devastating:
“It has demoralized our community....It bankrupted spiritually, morally and ﬁnancially people all over our
area.”152
To make matters worse, the rate of abuse appears only to be growing. In 1999, persons reporting at least
one non-medical use of OxyContin totaled 221,000.153 By 2000, that ﬁgure had grown to nearly 400,000.154
2001 saw the total grow again to 957,000 and ﬁnally in 2002 it jumped to 1.9 million.155
Once addicted, the prospects for abusers are bleak. Even the self-proclaimed “most successful” detoxiﬁcation
program for OxyContin provided by the Weismann Institute156 in Beverly Hills has only a 65% one-year
success rate.157 The closest competitor, Hazelden158, claims a 53% one-year success rate.159 Both programs
are incredibly expensive, however, with the Rapid Detox program at the Weismann Institute costing $19,000
for a four week session and Hazelden costing upwards of $10,000 for a three to four day program.160 Most
148See DEA supra note 113; See also Sweeney & Messing supra note 146.
149For example, a narcotic treatment program in southwestern Virginia reported that 80-85% of all new admissions were a
result of OxyContin. The state of South Carolina reported that 30% of all new admissions were of similar origin. Numbers
are similar in Louisiana and were last reported to be near 40%. Two centers in Pennsylvania report that 90% of all recent
admissions are tied to OxyContin. See DEA supra note 131.
150Id.
151See Sweeney & Messing supra note 146.
152See Josh White, OxyContin Abuse is Increasing, DEA Says, Wash. Post, Dec. 12, 2001 (available at:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&node=&contentId=A28805-2001Dec11&notFound=true).
153See 2002 National Survey on Drug Use and Health supra note 112.
154Id.
155Id.
156The website of the Weismann Institute can be found at http://www.opiates.com.
157See Jerry Adler, In the Grip of a Deeper Pain, Newsweek, Oct. 20, 2003.
158The website of Hazelden can be found at http://www.hazelden.org.
159See Adler supra note 156.
160Id.
27abusers, if they decide to enter rehab, must rely on traditional 12-step programs. For them, the prospect of
relapse within the ﬁrst year is 80%.161
The eﬀects have not just been felt with abusers. OxyContin-related crime has also sharply increased in the
most heavily abused areas. Violent crimes have included pharmacy robberies, attacks on customers as they
leave pharmacies, and home invasions.162 In recent years, as pharmacies stepped up security and physicians
became more aware of deceptive patients seeking prescriptions for illicit uses, addicts have turned to more
creative schemes to obtain their ﬁx. In Virginia, for instance, addicts have been posing as home buyers,
garage sale customers, building inspectors and even police oﬃcers in their attempt to gain access to legitimate
patient’s medicine cabinets or to unwary victim’s credit cards and credit card receipts.163 Other states have
identiﬁed addicts using obituaries to identify homes that would be empty in order to stage break-ins to
gain OxyContin or funds to buy OxyContin on the street.164 Some of the most eﬀected jurisdictions have
reported as much as a 75% increase in property and other crimes attributable to OxyContin.165
This is not surprising, as not only are addicts pushed to crime, but the proﬁt-incentive for non-users to
ﬁnd ways to get in on the illicit sale of OxyContin is substantial. Though OxyContin is sold in legitimate
channels at approximately $.09 to $.13 per milligram, it can go for up to a $1 a milligram on the street.166
Thus a 40-milligram OxyContin obtained legitimately through a doctor would cost a patient approximately
$4 at a pharmacy, but could be sold on the street for upwards of $40. In December of 2001, nine armed
assailants attacked a pharmaceutical distributor in Mexico City and stole of 30,000 bottles of OxyContin,
each containing 30 tablets of 20-milligram dose.167 The total street value for the theft was estimated to be
161Id.
162See Roche supra note 137; see also Rhonda Stewart, Police Seek Two Suspects in Armed Drugstore Heist, Boston Globe,
Sep. 15, 2002.
163See Donna Leinwand, Painkiller Thieves Get More Creative, USA Today, Dec. 1, 2003.
164Id.
165See DEA, Action Plan to Prevent the Diversion and Abuse of OxyContin (2002).
166See DEA supra note 131.
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28upwards of $20 million and the eventual destination was predicted to be the American black market.168
The question of the number of deaths that have resulted from OxyContin has been hotly debated between
members of the law enforcement community and Purdue Pharma. As of December 2001, the DEA had
estimated that 145 deaths could be veriﬁed as being tied to OxyContin, with another 318 other deaths
“likely related” to OxyContin.169 In calculating this ﬁgure, the DEA counted a death as an “OxyContin-
veriﬁed death” when medical reports or police information showed that an OxyContin tablet or prescription
was present at the scene or at the autopsy.170 This number, or similar ﬁgures, has been repeated in the
media171 and governmental agencies172 on multiple occasions.
A study published by the Journal of Analytical Toxicology in 2003, however, takes issue with the death
ﬁgures put forward by the DEA.173 After examining the ﬁles and information of all 1,243 oxycodone-related
deaths in 23 states between August of 1999 and January of 2002, the authors concluded that only 12 of the
deaths could be said to have been caused by OxyContin, and that only 18 others were linked to oxycodone.174
According to the study, 96.7% of the victims the DEA cited as OxyContin-linked deaths had at least three
other drugs in their system – including alcohol, cocaine, marijuana, anti-depressants or other narcotics.175
There are indications that the DEA itself may not necessarily believe the numbers can be relied upon as
168See White supra note 152.
169See Asa Hutchinson, Statement to House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and
Judiciary, December 11, 2001 (available at: http://www.health.org/govpubs/dea/0112oxytestimony.aspx).
170See Meier supra note 12 at 224; See also Ronald T. Libby, The DEA’s OxyContin Action Plan:
An Unproven Drug Epidemic, Testimony at House Office Building, Dec. 16, 2003 (available at:
http://www.aapsonline.org/painman/paindocs.htm)
171See White supra note 152 (stating that Hutchinson testimony claimed 300 deaths linked to OxyContin, with perhaps 500
more related as well); Josh White, Pill Probe Focuses on N. Va. Doctors, Wash. Post, Aug. 4, 2002 (stating that OxyContin
has “killed nearly 450 people”); Catherine Saillant, Ventura County Doctor Focus of Painkiller Inquiry, L.A. Times, Mar. 7,
2003 (“The narcotic, known as “hillbilly heroin” because its abuse ﬁrst surfaced in Appalachia, has been linked to more than
100 deaths since 1998.” This is despite a story just four days earlier in the Los Angeles Times that questioned the validity of
such numbers).
172See GAO report supra note 139 at 10 (citing the Orlando Sentinel story of 200 OxyContin-related deaths in Florida alone
since 2000 as well as the 146 ﬁgure originally referenced by the DEA).
173See Edward J. Cone, et al., Oxycodone Involvement in Drug Abuse Deaths: A DAWN-Based Classiﬁcation Scheme Applied
to an Oxycodone Postmortem Database Containing Over 1000 Cases, 2 Journal of Analytical Toxicology 57, 57-67 (March
2003) (it should be noted that Purdue funded the study).
174Id.; see also Linda Marsa, Medicine Drug Mix Proves Deadly, L.A. Times, Mar. 3, 2003 (for summary of study’s ﬁndings).
175Id.
29accurate.176
Some critics argue that the DEA has purposefully misstated the numbers surrounding abuse and deaths
related to OxyContin in order to create a sense of crisis.177 Others argue that the failure of the DEA and the
media to site accurate ﬁgures regarding OxyContin-related deaths is part of a larger “false narrative” that
asserts that the majority of OxyContin addicts are drug-na¨ ıve patients.178 The reality, they argue, is that
typical abuser is overwhelmingly likely to have a lengthy history of multiple-drug abuse – not the “accidental
addict” often put forward by the media.179 Other critics argue that even if the DEA numbers were accepted
as true, 464 deaths would work out to only 8 deaths for every 100,000 OxyContin prescriptions – a number
that would hardly be worthy of being called an “epidemic.”180
3. The Scope of the Problem
Regardless of how one comes down on the question of OxyContin-related deaths, it is hard to deny that the
eﬀect on the hardest hit communities has been immense. With that in mind, in order to properly evaluate
policy options that seek to maximize pain relief and minimize substance abuse, it is necessary to examine
the exact reasons why OxyContin abuse was able to spread so quickly.
One large part of the explanation as to the initial outbreak of abuse can be traced back to the history and
geography of regions where the abuse arose. As was mentioned earlier, the rural areas of Appalachia, western
Pennsylvania and the rural south had a long history of oxycodone abuse.181 Such regions favored oxycodone-
176See Meier supra note 12 (relaying the story of how oﬃcials at the DEA seemingly conceded that the data could not support
the stated fatality ﬁgures, and that FDA oﬃcials appeared to side with Purdue’s interpretation of the date).
177See Jane Spencer, Crackdown on Drugs Hits Chronic-Pain Patients, Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 2004.
178See Maia Szalavitz, The Accidental Addict, Clearing Away the Myths Surrounding the OxyContin “Epidemic,” Slate.com,
Mar. 25, 2004 (available at: http://slate.msn.com/id/2097786).
179Id.
180See Libby supra note 169.
181See Tough supra note 125; see also Burke supra note 138.
30based opiates primarily because such areas where far away from the heroin and cocaine networks that service
higher population urban areas.182 In the absence of such networks, the doctor’s oﬃce and pharmacy were
the next best opportunity for access to a high.183 Geography played another role as well – as in many cases,
life in a rural area makes access to rehabilitation clinics far more inconvenient.184
Also unlike the traditional opiate analgesics abused by addicts, however, OxyContin was incredibly pow-
erful – with a 40-miligram tablet containing eight times the amount of oxycodone of a previously popular
oxycodone-based painkiller, Tylox.185 Some researchers have also speculated that OxyContin may in fact
provide a better high than similar drugs in its class like morphine and oxycodone – though more research
needs to be done to make any conclusions on that front.186
Another diﬀerentiating factor with OxyContin was its vast availability. Many, in fact, have directly targeted
Purdue Pharma and their massive marketing campaign surrounding the debut of OxyContin as the primary
reason for the crisis of abuse that arose in 2000. Even pain treatment advocates, and supporters of OxyCon-
tin, like Dr. Russell Portenoy agree that no pharmaceutical company had ever promoted a high-strength
narcotic to so wide an audience – including a large number of general practitioners who were untrained in
sometimes sophisticated pain treatment techniques.187 A large number of lawsuits against Purdue center
around the question of misleading marketing practices and what they say was a deceptive attempt by the
pharmaceutical company to downplay the dangers of abuse and addiction and to promote the use of the
drug to patients who had equally eﬀective, and much less dangerous, alternative treatments available.188
182Id.
183Id.
184Id.; see also Meier supra note 12 at 112.
185Id.; see also supra note 135.
186See Meier supra note 12 at 278.
187Id.
188Id. at 92-104 (for a detailed account of Purdue’s strategy in 1996 and 1997 to substantially expand the potential market for
OxyContin); see also Heather Smith, The Pain Continues, The American Lawyer, Jan. 2004 (for a summary of the status
of the 380 private suits brought against Purdue related to OxyContin).
31A center point of the controversy surrounding Purdue’s marketing is the question of OxyContin’s iatrogenic
addiction risk – addiction that arises in the course of legitimate treatment by a physician as opposed to when
it is abused for non-medical purposes on the street.189 Though relevant directly to the OxyContin issue, it is
also central to the pain relief movement more broadly as the debate has begun to call into questions some of
the most fundamental tenants of those who advocate for the use of opiates for the treatment of chronic pain
– that the risk of addiction, when used properly, is minor. Purdue oﬃcials had argued, as late as 2000, that
OxyContin’s risk of addiction, when taken as prescribed, was one-half of one percent.190 Meanwhile, critics
of OxyContin were challenging the basic conclusions of the studies of the late 1970’s and early 1980’s that
pain treatment advocates had relied on in making their case for opiate-based treatments.191 Not only were
the studies based on an extremely limited data set, the studies themselves did not even speciﬁcally address
the addiction risk posed by the long-term use of opioids.192
Perhaps surprisingly, many of the staunchest advocates of the use of opiates in chronic pain treatment have
acknowledged that the assurances about the low-rate of addiction may have very well been overstated. In a
letter written to the Journal of Pain and Symptom Management in May 2001, Dr. Steven Passik admitted
that a misperception of addiction risk had contributed to the explosion of OxyContin abuse:
Unfortunately, the problem of opioid abuse during the course of pain management
is an issue over which—I’m afraid—those of us in the pain management commu-
nity have been somewhat disingenuous. While I certainly believe that the risk of
addiction, abuse and poor adherence (aberrant drug-related behavior) in the use of
these medications is far less than was once believed to be the case, it is not zero. In
our zeal to improve access to opioids and relieve patient suﬀering, pain specialists
have understated the problem, drawing faulty conclusions from very limited data.
In eﬀect, we have told primary care doctors and other prescribers that the risk was
so low that they essentially could ignore the possibility of addiction. We have also
overstated the concept that long-acting drugs have a lower risk of abuse.193
189See Barry Meier, The Delicate Balance of Pain and Addiction, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 2003.
190See Meier supra note 12 at 45.
191Id. at 173-75; see also Meier supra note 188 (detailing the critiques of the addiction-related studies of the late 70’s and
early 80’s).
192Id.
32Pain advocates are now moving toward a more nuanced view of addiction-risks – one that focuses more on
an individualized determination of each patient, rather than on broad conclusions across patient types.194
While it is generally accepted that the average biological addiction risk across the general population is
somewhere around 10%, pain treatment advocates continue to maintain that addiction rate continues to be
signiﬁcantly lower than that in less-vulnerable populations such as older patients.195 They do acknowledge,
however, that the risk is much higher amongst some other groups, such as patients already addicted to other
substances who are undergoing long-term opioid treatment for chronic pain.196 There also seems to be a
consensus across that board that signiﬁcant additional study needs to be done on the question of iatrogenic
addiction.
Though iatrogenic addiction is certainly one element of the OxyContin problem, another, much larger prob-
lem, is the problem of addiction associated with those using the drug for non-medical purposes. On this
front, the problem that OxyContin presents is not one of medical judgment of addiction risk, but one of
illegal diversion of prescription drugs for a non-medical use. Such diversion takes seven primary forms: 1)
deceptive patients who mislead their doctors into prescribing pain medication they do not actually need;
2) physicians who wrongly dispense opiates because of a lack of proper training in their use; 3) physicians
who are impaired; 4) corrupt physicians; 5) theft; 6) illegal internet distribution; and 7) foreign distribution
and diversion.197 Of these, deceptive patients are by far the most common source of diversion.198 It is thus
important when considering the policy options available to remember that the OxyContin problem is not
simply one of corrupt doctors or iatrogenic addiction.
194Id.
195See Portenoy interview supra note 15 (in reply to a question about OxyContin’s risk of addiction: “If the outcome in
question is true addiction, then the answer is considerably less than 10%. Ten percenet is viewed as a reasonable estimate of
the biological vulnerability to addiction in the overall population. Since chronic pain tends to occur disproportionately in the
older population, and an older subpopulation is likely to have a lower prevalence of addictive disease risk than a younger one,
it is likely that the risk in the subpopulation with chronic pain is substantially lower.”).
196See Passik supra note 192.
197See Ziegler & Lovrich supra note 41 at 76; See also DEA intelligence brief supra note 131.
198See Bonnie B. Wilford et al, An Overview of Prescription Drug Misuse and Abuse: Deﬁning the Problem and Seeking
Solutions, 22 J.L. Med. & Ethics 197, 199 (1994).
33IV. The Regulatory Framework and its Current Response
a. Regulatory Framework:
1. Federal Law – The Harrison Act
Ever since the Harrison Narcotics Act’s passage, signed into law in 1914, the federal government has regulated
the sale and distribution of opiates intended for medical use.199 The states themselves had been enacting
laws regulating or prohibiting the sale of opiates, cocaine, and other substances for non-medical purposes
since about 1900.200 The Harrison Act, however, signiﬁcantly expanded the federal role, and required for
the ﬁrst time that:
every person who produces, imports, manufactures, compounds, deals in, dispenses,
distributes, or gives away opium or coca leaves or any compound, manufacture, salt,
derivative, or preparation thereof, shall register with the collector of internal revenue
of the district, his name or style, place of business, and place or places where such
business is to be carried on.201
Upon registration, each registrant would then be obligated to pay an annual tax of $1 to the US Treasury
Department.202 Physicians were required to keep detailed records of the date of the prescription, how much
it was for and who it was written for and all of the information had to be kept for two years.203
199Harrison Narcotic Act, Chap. 1 Public Law No. 223, 63rd Cong., approved December 17, 1914. (1914) (available at:
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaﬀer/history/e1910/harrisonact.htm).
200See Acker supra note 68 at 33.
202Id.
203Id.
34Though it appeared not to regulate the actual interaction between the patient and physician on its face, there
was one sentence that provided federal oﬃcials with a window to crack down on more controversial medical
uses of the opiates: “Nothing contained in this section shall apply....To the dispensing or distribution of
any of the aforesaid drugs to a patient by a physician, dentist, or veterinary surgeon registered under this
Act in the course of his professional practice only.”204 Violations of the Act carried the potential of a $2000
ﬁne and/or 5 years in prison.205
Though most physicians at the time felt that they were free to continue to prescribe opiates as they saw ﬁt
as long as they adhered to the registration and record keeping requirements, it quickly became clear that the
Treasury Department was going to prosecute doctors who issued prescriptions for the purpose of managing
the addiction of those dependent on narcotics.206 It quickly became known in the medical community
that Treasury oﬃcials were on the lookout for physicians who were accepting large numbers of addicts as
patients.207 As the gatekeepers to the only legal channel of obtaining opiates, “physicians became increasingly
wary of patients complaining of mysterious pains and demanding relief through drugs.”208 Though many
physicians and lawyers speculated that such regulation was unconstitutional and an inappropriate incursion
on the independence of the medical profession, the threat of negative publicity resulting from an investigation,
even if it didn’t result in a conviction, was enough to deter physicians from prescribing opiates.209
Finally, in 1919, the Supreme Court upheld the lawfulness of such prosecutions in the case of United States
v. Doremus,210 The court held that a prescription for opiates to a person known as a “dope ﬁend” was not
a “legitimate practice” of the medical profession, and that it was within the constitutional powers of the
federal government to prosecution such violations.211 Though the question in 1919 was that of prescription
204Id. (italics added).
205Id.
206See Acker supra note 68 at 35.
207Id. at 51.
208Id. at 62.
209Id. at 51.
210See United States v. Doremus, 39 S.Ct. 214 (1919).
211Id.
35of opiates for the purpose of maintaining addiction – a practice that was later federally funded in the 1970’s
with the establishment of methadone clinics across the country212 – the issues of chill and fear of prosecution
for the practice of medicine involving opiates is remarkably similar to the application of today’s federal drug
laws to physicians engaged in sometimes controversial treatment of chronic pain.213
2. Federal Law – The Modern Structure
Today, the primary legislation214 governing the federal government’s regulation of opioid analgesics such as
OxyContin is the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) – enacted in 1970.215 In enacting the CSA, Congress
explicitly acknowledged that “many of the drugs included within this title have a useful and legitimate
medical purpose and are necessary to maintain the health and general welfare of the American people.”216
Following that opening statement, the CSA goes on to declare that “the illegal importation, manufacture,
distribution, and possession and improper use of controlled substances have a substantial and detrimental
eﬀect on the health and general welfare of the American people.”217 It is this tension between medical and
criminal that lies at the heart of the debate of the federal role in the regulation of opiates used to treat
moderate to severe pain. If the balance is struck incorrectly, the potential for needless suﬀering on either
212See Acker supra note 68 at 218.
213See Josh White, Pill Probe Focuses on N.Va. Doctors, Wash. Post, Aug. 4, 2002 (quoting Dr. William Hurwitz, a well-
known Virginia pain specialist currently being prosecuted by federal oﬃcials for distribution of controlled substances outside
of legitimate medical practice: “this is a symbolic investigation with a political agenda to squelch OxyContin and other pain
medications....It’s easy to put fear in the mom-and-pop pharmacies and into the doctors because we are easy to scare to death.
They’re looking at us as Maﬁa dons and the heads of drug cartels, while we’re just trying to help patients who are in serious
pain and are in dire need of help.”).
214The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act also plays a role as it grants the Food and Drug Administration the authority
to evaluated and approve drugs prior to becoming eligible for distribution for medical use. Because pre-market approval of pain
relief medications is not a primary focus of this paper, however, it will not be discussed at length. For a discussion of the role
of the FDA in the pain relief debate see Lars Noah, Challenges in the Federal Regulation of Pain Management Technologies,
31 J.L. Med. & Ethics 55 (2003).
215See Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, title II, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codiﬁed as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§801-904 (2000).
21621 U.S.C. §801(1).
21721 U.S.C. §801(2).
36side of the balance is substantial.
Under the CSA, all federally regulated drugs are organized into one of ﬁve “schedules.”218 Each substance is
classiﬁed depending on whether it has a “currently accepted medical use,” whether it is safe for use “under
medical supervision,” whether there is a danger of abuse, and whether it may lead to physical or psychological
dependence.219 OxyContin and other oxycodone-based pain relievers are Schedule II drugs which means that
they are highly subject to abuse and dependence, but also have an accepted medical use220 (as opposed to
Schedule I drugs that are subject to abuse and have no accepted medical use such as heroin, and Schedule
III, IV, and V drugs that have progressively less danger for abuse and dependence).221
In order to prescribe Schedule II drugs such as OxyContin, physicians must register with the Attorney
General.222 The Attorney General will register a physician unless he deems it to be “inconsistent with the
public interest.”223 In determining whether or not a registration is inconsistent with the public interest, the
Attorney General must consider the following factors:
1.
Maintenance of eﬀective control against diversion of particular controlled substances into
other than legitimate medical, scientiﬁc, and industrial channels;
21821 U.S.C. §812.
21921 U.S.C. §812(b).
22021 U.S.C. §812(b)(2).
221See 21 U.S.C. §812(1)-(5).
222See 21 U.S.C. §822(a).
22321 U.S.C. §823(b).
372.
Compliance with applicable State and local law;
3. Prior conviction record of applicant under Federal or State laws relating to the manufacture, distribu-
tion, or dispensing of such substances;
4. Past experience in the distribution of controlled substances; and
5. Such other factors as may be relevant to and consistent with the public health and safety.224
There are other unique restrictions that apply to Schedule II substances as well. Prescriptions must be
written, not phoned in or faxed.225 They also cannot be reﬁlled.226 Manufacturers must register with
the Attorney General as well,227 and follow DEA-set production quotas.228 Furthermore, a regulation was
promulgated pursuant to the CSA shortly after its passage that bears directly on the question of physicians
and pharmacists concerned with the prospect of regulatory scrutiny for dispensing signiﬁcant amounts of
opiate analgesics for the treatment of moderate to severe pain. It reads:
a prescription for a controlled substance to be eﬀective must be issued for a legiti-
mate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his
professional practice....An order purporting to be a prescription issued not in the
usual course of professional treatment or in legitimate and authorized research is not
a prescription within the meaning of section 309 of the Act...(21 U.S.C. 829) and the
person knowingly ﬁlling such a purported prescription, as well as the person issuing
it, shall be subject to the penalties provided for violations for the provisions of law
relating to controlled substances.229
As the Court explained in United States v. Moore, “physicians who stepped outside the bounds of profes-
22421 U.S.C. §823(b)(1)-(5).
22521 U.S.C. §829(a).
226Id.
22721 U.S.C. §823(a).
22821 U.S.C. §826.
38sional practice could be prosecution under the Harrison Act (Narcotics) of 1914,” and the CSA “was intended
to ‘strengthen,’ rather than to weaken, ‘the previously existing federal law enforcement authority.”230
For the physician aggressively treating pain with opioids, the question of how the terms “legitimate medical
purpose” and “usual course of his professional practice” will be of central importance to their incentive
structure in treating patients in the future. Unfortunately for many physicians, the current behavior of the
DEA and Department of Justice seems to be creating more confusion on this front than clarity – and the
eﬀect on pain treatment has been signiﬁcant.
3. State Law
Though federal law dictates many of the legal aspects related to the distribution, sale and transport of
controlled substances, state law almost always governs the medical use of such substances – usually through
the mechanism of state medical boards who are charged with investigating complaints against physicians
for unprofessional practice and disciplining them for violations if they are found to exist.231 When DEA
investigations ﬁnd no evidence of illicit use or diversion, they will often turn over investigations of physicians
to state medical boards to determine if the treatment was nonetheless within the course of professional
conduct.232
Each state sets their own standards, and as such there are a variety of approaches across the country to
230423 U.S.122, 132 (1975) (In Moore the Court upheld the conviction of a physician who was “drug traﬃcking” and selling
drugs not for medical reasons, but for proﬁt pruposes).
231See Martino supra note 36 at 332
232See Rich supra note 11 at 48.
39the question of opioid use to treat pain.233 Additionally, there has been a substantial amount of change in
these policies over the past ten years. For instance, prior to 1989, there were few state medical boards that
had policies on the question of pain relief.234 Since then, however, forty-one states have adopted guidelines,
regulations or policy statements to provide guidance on the prescription of opiates to treat chronic pain and
pain at the end of life.235 Whether or not this guidance has helped to make progress in the eﬀort to address
undertreated pain is a question addressed in the section following.
It should also be noted that in certain extreme cases, physicians prescribing opiates are sometimes subject to
state criminal prosecution for manslaughter or murder. This usually occurs in the context of end of life care
where a physician is accused of causing the death intentionally236 or where opioid prescriptions are linked
to the death of a patient.237
b. Current Response
1. The Federal Response
In looking over the policy changes of the past decade, there are valid grounds, at least on paper, to argue
that federal policy has shifted toward a recognition that undertreatment of pain is a serious public health
issue. Unfortunately for physicians and patients who are currently undertreated, actions have spoken much
233See Joranson et al. supra note 14 (providing a survey of the 50 states regulatory board’s approach toward the use of opioids
to treat pain).
234Id.
235Id.
236See Ann Alpers, Criminal Act or Palliative Care? Prosecutions Involving Care of the Dying, 26 J.L. Med. & Ethics 308
(1998) (examining recent criminal prosecutions against doctors related to care at the end of life).
237Cases related to overdose deaths connected to physician-prescribed OxyContin are one example of such a case that have
become more frequent in recent years, and they will discussed in the next section. For example, see Bill Kzczor, PanHandle
Doctor’s OxyContin Conviction to Send Message, Denver Rocky Mountain News, Feb. 20, 2002. (discussing the case of
Dr. James Graves, convicted of manslaughter in Florida in connection to the OxyContin-related overdose deaths of four of his
patients. He was sentenced to 63 years in prison.).
40louder than words.
In 1992, for instance, the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, a branch of the Department of Health
and Human Services, issued guidelines recognizing the failure to manage acute pain resulting from surgery
and encouraging the use of opioid analgesics.238 Two years later, the same agency issued similar guidelines
for the treatment of cancer pain.239 In 2000, Congress went so far as to declare the coming ten years the
“Decade of Pain Control and Research.”240 In 2001, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care
Organizations began requiring that the 19,000 hospitals and care facilities that it accredits implement new
heightened pain management standards.241
In 1997, the Supreme Court rejected two 14th Amendment challenges to state prohibitions to assisted sui-
cide.242 In doing so, however, some believe some of the justices, if not a majority, may very well have
recognized a constitutional right to palliative care, at least at the end of life.243
In recent public statements, the DEA and its oﬃcers have also seemingly embraced the need to bring legiti-
macy to the use of opioid analgesics in treating pain. In fact, as far back as 1988, the DEA has seemingly
backed such a stance, stating: “The CSA requirement for a determination of legitimate medical need is
based on the undisputed proposition that patients and pharmacies should be able to obtain suﬃcient quan-
tities...of any schedule II drug, to ﬁll prescriptions. A therapeutic drug should be available to patients
238See Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, Acute Pain Management: Operative or Medical Procedures
and Trauma 1 (1992).
239See Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, Management of Cancer Pain (1994).
240See H.R. 3244, Title VI, §1603 (2000).
241See Carolyn Kleiner, A Curse and a Cure, U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 6, 2001. (information on the guidelines
available at: http://www.jcaho.org/news+room/health+care+issues/jcaho+focuses+on+pain+management.htm)
242See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
243See Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks: Not Assisted Suicide but a Constitutional Right to Palliative Care, 337
New Eng. J. Med. 1234, 1234-35 (1997); see also Jesse Chiper, On the Court’s 1996-1997 Term, 19 Cardozo L. Rev.
2259, 2281 (1998) (arguing that Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Glucksberg indicated a right to palliative care, even when
hastening death, and that at least three other justices would agree with her on that point.); see also Susan Wolf, Foreword:
Facing Death, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 885, 889 (1998) (arguing that at least two justices indicated a constitutional right to adequate
pain relief.).
41when they need it....”244 In 2001, the DEA joined with a collection of 21 pain-treatment advocacy groups
to issue a joint statement indicating that “preventing drug abuse is an important societal goal, but there
is a consensus, by law enforcement agencies, health care practitioners, and patient advocates alike, that it
should not hinder patients’ ability to receive the care they need and deserve.”245 The statement went on
to acknowledge that “for many patients, opioid analgesics – when used as recommended by established pain
management guidelines – are the most eﬀective way to treat their pain, and often the only treatment option
that provides signiﬁcant relief.”246 Finally, the DEA addressed, and attempted to refute, one of the most
common charges against them: “Focusing only on the abuse potential of a drug, however, could erroneously
lead to the conclusion that these medications should be avoided when medically indicated – generating a
sense of fear rather than respect for their legitimate properties.247
DEA oﬃcials have stated similar goals in public statements surrounding the recent OxyContin developments
as well. In a 2001 appearance before the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judi-
ciary, the DEA Administrator at the time, Asa Hutchinson, assured committee members that the DEA did
not “intend to restrict legitimate use of OxyContin, nor prevent practitioners acting in the usual course of
their medical practice from prescribing OxyContin for patients with a legitimate medical purpose.”248 In a
statement made just last month, the message from the current DEA Administrator Karen Tandy was almost
identical: “I don’t want legitimate patients in pain undertreated because of fears of criminal prosecution.”249
The message that physicians and pain treatment advocates are getting from the DEA in recent years, how-
ever, is quite diﬀerent. In a number of recent high-proﬁle cases, the DEA has made it clear that physicians
will be a major target of the agency’s eﬀorts to clamp down on the problem of OxyContin diversion. One
24453 Federal Register 50593 (1988).
245A Joint Statement From 21 Health Organizations and the Drug Enforcement Administration (2001) (available
at: http://www.ampainsoc.org/advocacy/promoting.htm).
246Id.
247Id.
248See Hutchinson supra note 20.
249See Spencer supra note 77.
42such case is the prosecution of well-known pain specialist Dr. William Hurwitz and pharmacist who ﬁlled
his prescriptions, Joseph Statkus.250 Prosecutors say that “through willful blindness, deliberate ignorance,
if not intent” the pair, through their medical practice, provided OxyContin to dozens of individuals who
later sold the drugs on the illegal market throughout the south.251 They were indicted in September of 2003
on 49 counts ranging from drug traﬃcking resulting in death and serious injury to engaging in a criminal
enterprise and health care fraud.252 If convicted the pair faces life in prison.253
The facts of the case will not be clear until trial, but what is clear is that the case has exposed once again
the deep tension that exists between the pain treatment community and the law enforcement oﬃcials they
believe are out to get them.254 Critics of the federal response argue that the new, aggressive stance of law
enforcement has tipped the delicate balance between pain treatment and preventing diversion of controlled
substances “drastically in the direction of ruthless drug control.” 255
They point to the sometimes-ﬁery rhetoric of federal oﬃcials who they say are unfairly targeting doctors who
are just trying to treat their patient’s pain. In discussing the investigation surrounding the Hurwitz case,
a federal prosecutor explained the government’s strategy less than a year after September 11th by stating
that,
the growing national plague of Oxy addictions, overdoses and deaths caused by the
illegal activity of some doctors, pharmacists and patients has been focused on like
a laser beam by this oﬃce and other U.S. attorney’s oﬃces,...If any person falls
into one of those three categories, our oﬃce will try our best to root that person out
like the Taliban.256
Attorney General John Ashcroft, while not mentioning the role that drugs like OxyContin play in the treat-
ment of pain, commented on the indictment of Hurwitz: “The indictment and arrests in Virginia demonstrate
250See Josh White, Virginia Doctor Indicted in OxyContin Scheme, Wash. Post, Sep. 26, 2003.
251See Josh White, 2 N. Va. Doctors Linked to Deluge of Illegal Drugs, Wash. Post, Dec. 23, 2002.
252See White supra note 250.
253Id.
254See Vartabedian supra note 143.
255Id. (quoting David Brushwood, a lawyer and professor of pharmacology at the University of Florida).
43our commitment to bring justice to all those who traﬃc in this very dangerous drug,...We will continue
to pursue vigorously physicians and others who are responsible for turning OxyContin from a legitimate
painkiller to a vehicle of addiction and death.”257 Another federal prosecutor in the case recently referred
to Hurwitz as a “street-corner crack dealer.”258 Though they ultimately did not pursue the course, federal
prosecutors in the case also initially threatened to seek the death penalty against Hurwitz under laws origi-
nally designed to target drug kingpens.259
A surprising number of medical organizations and pain-treatment advocates have come out in support of
Dr. Hurwitz260 and warn that a continued strategy of targeting physicians will serve only to hurt millions
of innocent patients who will ﬁnd it increasingly more diﬃcult to ﬁnd access to legitimate pain treatment.
Dr. Russell Portenoy fears that “ﬁfteen years of progress in treating patients in chronic pain could really be
wiped away if these prosecutions continue....what’s happening now is that the medical ambiguity is being
turned into allegations of criminal behavior.”261 The Association of American Physicians and Surgeons – an
organization representing 4,000 physicians nationwide – claims that “physicians are being threatened, im-
poverished, delicensed, and imprisoned for prescribing in good faith with the intention of relieving pain, and
their patients become the collateral damage in this trumped-up war.”262 Dr. Michael Fleming, President of
the 94,000 member American Academy of Family Physicians agrees that physicians are growing more con-
cerned with the threat of regulatory scrutiny: “There is no question that doctors now fear being held liable
if they prescribe painkillers.”263 Rebecca Patchin, a board member of the American Medical Association
257See White supra note 250.
258See Josh White & Marc Kaufman, U.S. Compares Va. Pain Doctor to “Crack Dealer,” Wash. Post, Sep. 30, 2003.
259See White supra note 251.
260Those publicly supporting Dr. Hurwitz include the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, the Pain Relief
Network, the American Pain Institute, and the National Foundation for the Treatment of Pain. See Vartabedian supra note
143.
261See Kaufman supra note 22; In a recent interview Dr. Portenoy conﬁrmed the level of fear is high: “most pain specialists
perceive a much higher level of fear in the physician community.” See Portenoy interview supra note 15.
262See Florida’s War on Drugs Now a War on Doctors Says Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Newswire, Jan.
16, 2004.
263See Vartabedian supra note 251.
44also believes that the eﬀect of the prosecutions will ultimately be to hurt legitimate pain patients.264
Some critics of the federal response to the OxyContin crisis also point to the recent attempt by the Depart-
ment of Justice to revoke physician’s controlled substance registration for participating in Oregon’s Death
with Dignity Act as another example of the federal government unnecessarily using the CSA to chill pain
treatment. For the ﬁrst time the Attorney General and the DEA are asserting the right to deﬁne nationally
what constitutes a “legitimate medical purpose” for the purposes of the CSA.265 Under the Attorney Gen-
eral’s interpretation of the CSA, any Oregon physician assisting a patient in utilizing their right under the
state’s Death with Dignity Act would face revocation of their registration to dispense Schedule II drugs.266
Not only does the goal of the Attorney General’s eﬀort seem tangentially related to the purpose of avoiding
the diversion of drugs into illegal channels – the motivating force behind the implementation of the CSA267 –
many pain relief advocates who do not support physician-assisted suicide fear that the regulation will further
deter doctors everywhere – not just in Oregon – from properly treating pain.268 First and foremost, critics
argue that physicians at the end of life who are not necessarily familiar with the nuances of law may avoid
264See Kaufman supra note 22. (“Doctors hear what’s happening to other physicians, and that makes them very reluctant to
prescribe opioids that patients might well need.”).
265The relevant portion of the Ashcroft Directive reads: “I hereby determine that assisting suicide is not a “legitimate medical
purpose” within the meaning of 21 C.F.R. §1306.04 (2001), and that the prescribing, dispensing, or administering federally
controlled substances to assist suicide violates the CSA.” See Memorandum from U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft to DEA
Administrator Asa Hutchinson, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607 (Nov. 9, 2001), reprinted in 17 Issues in Law & Med. 265 (2002). This
interpretation is directly contrary to Attorney General Janet Reno’s interpretation of the CSA issued in 1998: “There is no
evidence that Congress, in the CSA, intended to displace the states as the primary regulators of the medical profession, or to
override a state’s determination as to what constitutes legitimate medical practice in the absence of a federal law prohibiting
that practice.” See Letter from Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney General, to Henry J. Hyde, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. House of Representatives (June 5, 1998) (available at http://www.house.gov./judiciary/attygen.htm).
266See Memorandum from U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft supra note 265.
267See Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1090 (D. Or. 2002) (holding that “Defendants cannot seriously con-
clude...that Congress delegated to federal prosecutors the authority to deﬁne what constitutes a legitimate medical practice.”
268See Brief of Amici Curiae for the American Academy of Pain Management et al. (available at:
http://www.compassionindying.org/ashcroft ruling/patient bief.pdf). (those signing onto the amicus included the
Academy of Pain Management, the California Medical Association, the American Geriatrics Society, The Society of General
Internal Medicine, Dr. Russell Portenoy, Ann Jackson (Executive Director of the Oregon Hospice Association), Dr. Charles F.
McKhann (Professor of General Surgery and Surgical Oncology, Yale University School of Medicine) and Dr. Robert V. Brody
(Chair, Ethics Committee, San Francisco General Hospital).
45prescribing suﬃcient doses of opioids or other drugs at the end of life to avoid DEA investigation.269 Such
an eﬀect would run contrary to the endorsement of aggressive pain treatment, double eﬀect, and terminal
sedation by the Supreme Court just ﬁve years ago in Washington v. Glucksberg.270 As one expert noted,
the Ashcroft interpretation of the CSA would allow DEA agents “with absolutely no experience in end-of-
life care” to determine “if large doses of medication physicians sometimes prescribe to treat terminally ill
patients are used with the intent of hastening death or relieving pain.”271
Further, many worry that a move toward allowing a law enforcement oﬃcial or agency – rather than the
medical community and states – to deﬁne what constitutes a “legitimate medical purpose” will undue
the signiﬁcant eﬀorts of the states to clarify pain treatment guidelines to reassure physicians undertaking
appropriate pain treatment that they will not face disciplinary or criminal sanctions.272 In just 1998, the
Chief of the Liason and Policy Section of the DEA’s Oﬃce of Diversion made the following statement in an
attempt to reassure doctors prescribing opioids that the DEA would not second-guess the judgments of the
medical community on the question of the legitimate use of opioids: “the CSA by design does not deﬁne
‘legitimate medical purpose’ nor does it set forth standards of medical practice. These issues can only be
deﬁned by the medical community and its internal review processes.”273
2. The Response of the States
States have also had diﬃculty in dealing with the conﬂicts between law enforcement eﬀorts and the attempt
to make progress against pain. In 1998, in response to a call for more clarity in state regulatory policy toward
269Id.
270See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737-38 (J. O’Connor concurring) (“There is no dispute that dying pa-
tients...can obtain palliative care, even when doing so would hasten their deaths.”)
271Dr. Jerome Groopman, Separating Death From Agony, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 2001.
272See Amici supra note 268.
273Speech by Patricia M. Good before the Federation of State Medical Boards Symposium on Pain Management and State
Regulatory Policy (March 17, 1998) (available at: http://www.medsch.wisc.edu/painpolicy/domestic/dea98.htm).
46the use of opioids in pain treatment, and physicians’ liability for such use, the Federation of State Medical
Boards of the United States issued model guidelines for the use of controlled substances in the treatment of
pain.274 In the preamble, the guidelines recognize that “controlled substances, including opioid analgesics,
may be essential in the treatment of acute pain due to trauma or surgery and chronic pain, whether due
to cancer or non-cancer origins.”275 Furthermore, while acknowledging that physicians must be diligent to
prevent diversion and abuse, there is an attempt to provide physicians with a safe-harbor from regulatory
scrutiny:
Physicians should not fear disciplinary action from the Board or other state regulatory or enforce-
ment agency for prescribing, dispensing, or administering controlled substances, including opioid
analgesics, for a legitimate medical purpose and in the usual course of professional practice. The
Board will consider prescribing, ordering, administering, or dispensing controlled substances for
pain to be for a legitimate medical purpose if based on accepted scientiﬁc knowledge of the treat-
ment of pain or if based on sound clinical grounds. All such prescribing must be based on clear
documentation of unrelieved pain and in compliance with applicable state or federal law.276
In order to provide further guidance to physicians seeking assurances that they will not be punished, the
guidelines lay out six guidelines for physicians to follow in treating patients with opioid analgesics:
1.
A complete medical history and physical examination must be conducted and documented
in the medial record.
2. A treatment plan must be completed.
3.
274The Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States, Model Guidelines
for the Use of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain (1998) (available at:
http://www.medsch.wisc.edu/painpolicy/domestic/model.htm).
275Id.
47The patient should be notiﬁed of the risks and beneﬁts of the use of controlled substances.
The doctor should also consider a written agreement with the patient outlining patient responsibil-
ities.
4.
The physicians should undertake periodic reviews of the course and success of the treatment
and make necessary adjustments in treatment.
5.
The physician should be willing to refer the patient for additional evaluation if necessary,
and special attention should be paid to patients who are at higher risk of misuse or diversion (such
as those with a history of substance abuse or psychiatric disorders).
6.
Complete and accurate medical records should be kept.
7. Physicians should comply with federal and state laws for registration.277
As of this year, six states have adopted the model guidelines described above.278 Another sixteen states have
adopted a portion of the model guidelines.279 Even the DEA has expressed its support of the guidelines.280
States that have not adopted the Model Guidelines have nonetheless made progress in changes to state
regulatory board policy so as to encourage pain management and the use of opioids.281 Studies indicate,
however, that such changes have not substantially addressed physicians’ concern about regulatory scrutiny.282
One primary reason for this has been an increase in high proﬁle prosecutions at the state level related to
277Id.
278Those states are Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, and Texas. See Joranson et al. supra note 14.
279See Aaron M. Gilson et al., Improving State Medical Board Policies: Inﬂuence of a Model, 31 J.L. Med. & Ethics 119,
120 (2003).
280See supra note 273.
281See Joranson supra note 14. (surveying the positive changes that have occurred between 2000 and 2003).
282See Gilson supra note 279 and 129; see also Joranson supra note 14 at 18 (“Achieving balance and consistency in pain
policy among the states remains an elusive goal.”
48the prescription of opiates. One of the most dramatic cases involved Dr. Frank Fisher who was arrested by
California state authorities in February of 1999.283 He was charged with three counts of murder in connection
with the oxycodone-related overdose deaths of three of his patients.284 He was also charged with conspiring
to defraud the state by ﬁling $2 million in false medical claims.285 In 1998, Fisher had written 46% of all the
prescriptions for 80-milligram OxyContin in the state.286 The prosecutor explained the charges as follows:
“It is the staggering amounts of this drug that were made available and under circumstances where it was
reasonably foreseeable that these drugs would leak on to and become part of the illicit street market the
forms the basis of the homicide charge.” 287 After spending four months in jail while facing charges, Fisher
was released after his murder charge was reduced to manslaughter.288 Finally, in 2003, all charges against
Fisher were dropped, though he now is ﬁnancially ruined and has been forced to move into his father’s
home.289
Similar prosecutions have been undertaken across the country. Florida became the ﬁrst state to convict a
physician of manslaughter in 2002 when Dr. James Graves was sentenced to 63 years in prison in connection
with the OxyContin-related overdoses of four of his patients.290 Calling the death toll from prescription drug
abuse “mass murder,” the Director of the Oﬃce of Drug Control for the state of Florida indicated that the
case was intended to send a message: “We want to make an example out of those doctors who are violating
the Hippocratic oath and the law....Any professional who does that will suﬀer the consequences.”291 In
another case in California, Dr. Michael Huﬀ and pharmacist Richard Ozar were charged in a 90-count
283See Meier supra note 13 at 254-63 (for an overview of the Fisher case prior to all charges being dropped).
284Id. at 254.
285Id.
286Id at 255.
287Id.
288Id. at 263.
289See Vartabedian supra note 143.
290See AP, Doctor Given Long Prison Term for 4 Deaths Tied to OxyContin, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 2003; see also Bill Kaczor,
Panhandle Doctor’s OxyContin Conviction to Send Message, Denver Rocky Mountain News, Feb. 20, 2002.
291See Fred Schulte, State Drug Czar Pledges to Stem Painkiller Abuse, Bradenton Herald, Aug. 1, 2003.
49indictment for conspiracy and unlawful distribution of a controlled substance.292 They face 20 years in
prison for each of the 89 counts of unlawful distribution and 15 for the conspiracy count.293 The assistant
chief of the California Department of Justice indicated that the arrest was just the tip of the iceberg and
that other arrests should be anticipated.294 The merits of the above cases are not to be evaluated in this
forum, and most, if not all, of them very well may have been legitimate actions to protect the public, but
the eﬀect they have on legitimate pain treatment is signiﬁcant nonetheless.
Some states have also sent mixed messages about their commitment to addressing the problem of undertreat-
ment of pain by placing additional obstacles in the way of legitimate pain patients obtaining the medication
they need. In response to the OxyContin abuse problem, at least nine states have imposed restrictions
on Medicaid payments for the drug.295 Vermont was the ﬁrst state to take this step when then-Governor
Howard Dean ordered a halt to not only Medicaid payments for OxyContin, but also to all state-funded
health care payments for the drug.296 Though he left an exception for terminal cancer patients and those
suﬀering from sickle-cell anemia, he nonetheless suggested pharmacies remove the drug from their shelves.297
South Carolina instituted similar restrictions, though they also allowed an exception for AIDS patients.298
Alabama, Maine, Florida, Michigan, Mississippi, North Carolina and West Virginia have placed limits on
the amount of the drug a Medicaid patient can receive without prior approval from a state oﬃcial.299
292See Amanda Covarrubias, Doctor, Pharmacist Arrested Over Pills, L.A. Times, Dec. 3, 2003.
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50V. Principles for Reform
a. The Need for Balance
If there is something that all sides agree on in the debate over prescription drug abuse and the undertreat-
ment of pain it is that the status quo is not working. Physicians feel persecuted, patients suﬀering from
chronic and end of life pain are still vastly undertreated, and the destruction caused by prescription drug
abuse and diversion is only growing. The answer to the policy dilemmas will not be found, however, until
balance is restored to the debate and both sides – the pain relief community and law enforcement oﬃcials
– realize that the other has legitimate and necessary goals to pursue. As the World Health Organization
Expert Committee on Cancer Pain Relief and Active Supportive Care articulated their vision for reform:
“...governments have the right to impose further restrictions if they consider it necessary, to prevent diver-
sion and misuse of opioids. However, this right must be continually balanced against the responsibility to
ensure opioid availability for medical purposes....”300
As it currently stands, some vocal players in the debate are pursuing solutions that ignore the need for this
balance. On the law enforcement, anti-addiction side, a small minority is advocating an outright prohibition
on opiates like OxyContin.301 A larger number, including the DEA, seek to stem the problem of OxyContin
by limiting its availability to only those in severe pain, and to only allow pain specialists to prescribe the
drug. 302 A recent FDA advisory committee rejected both of those proposals late last year.303 A proposal
to limit its availability to patients in severe pain was defeated by a vote of 13-5 with opponents of the
300See World Health Organization, Cancer Pain Relief: With a Guide to Opioid Availability, 55 (1996) (available
at: http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/9241544821.pdf).
301See West Virginia Bill Sought to Ban OxyContin, Pharmacist.com, Mar. 15, 2002 (available at:
http://www.pharmacist.com/articles/d dn 0009.cfm) (the state senator who sponsored the bill sought to ban OxyContin
within West Virginia because “people just can’t handle it, and it’s costing our state untold millions already...that’s just
dollars, not to mention destroyed lives.” The bill did not make it out of committee).
302The DEA and Rep. Hal Rogers of Kentucky recently recommended that the FDA restrict access to OxyContin only to
patients with “severe pain” and to prohibit non-pain specialists from prescribing it. See Doris Bloodsworth, FDA Urged to Get
Tougher on Drug’s Maker, Orlando Sentinel, Oct. 19, 2003.
303See Gardiner Harris, Drug Panel Rejects Please to Curb Sales of a Widely Abused Painkiller, N.Y. Times, Sep. 11, 2003.
51proposal arguing that such ambiguity would hurt legitimate pain patients and invite prosecutions or fear of
prosecution.304 Restrictions on access to the drug to pain clinics or pain specialists were also rejected with
the panel citing the eﬀect that such restrictions would have on legitimate patients in rural areas.305
Similarly, those who seek to advocate pain advocacy must also acknowledge and confront the legitimate
problems of addiction and abuse that come along with large-scale use of opioid analgesics. Though some ad-
vocates seem unwilling to acknowledge that corrupt doctors exist, there are legitimate cases where physicians
have misused their position as a gatekeeper to controlled substances for improper ends.306 Law enforcement
should be commended for identifying and punishing such criminals, and pain-relief advocates should actively
seek to cooperate to develop strategies to combat such abuse. They should also acknowledge, as Russell
Portenoy has done, that pain-relief advocates have, at times, failed to adequately confront the policy chal-
lenges and trade-oﬀs that come with pursuing an aggressive pain treatment agenda. As he explains it, there
had been
a tacit reluctance on the part of supporters, including pain specialists, those in the
media who had been portraying the problem of undertreatment, patient advocates
and industry to discuss the legitimate risk associated with opioid toxicity and abuse
addiction because of the concern that if we opened up Pandora’s box and talked
about addiction and abuse, all of the progress that had been made during the past
ten years would be lost....There has been a bit of a tacit understanding that we
won’t talk about it too much. We do need to talk about it.307
In order for workable policy solutions to be crafted, both sides must lend their expertise to the challenge
with a joint commitment to a balanced policy that takes the threat of both the epidemics of undertreatment
of pain and of prescription drug abuse seriously.
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305Id.
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Charges, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Mar. 10, 2004 (doctor convicted of 153 counts of distributing OxyContin and other
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52b. The Need for More Research
Considering the number of people adversely aﬀected by the undertreatment of pain and the abuse of pre-
scription drugs, it is remarkable that there has not been more research done on some of the questions central
to the most important policy debates. One of the most important questions that requires further study is
the true addiction rate for long-term use of opioid analgesics in chronic pain patients. It appears that the
previous studies relied upon by pain-relief advocates have been deemed inconclusive at best.308 Even leading
physicians in the pain relief movement cannot say with conﬁdence what the average rate of addiction will
be in such a context.309 Being able to accurately identify the rate of iatrogenic addiction with opioid anal-
gesics is of paramount importance in providing physicians with enough data to make appropriate medical
judgments when confronted with chronic pain patients.
Additional data that policy makers require, but that is not currently available is the percentage of the Oxy-
Contin abuse problem that can be traced back to various origins.310 How many OxyContin addicts became
addicted through legitimate physician-initiated prescriptions? What percentage instead is made up of heroin
users who use OxyContin as a substitute when heroin is not available? How many OxyContin addicts are
poly-drug addicts who began using OxyContin as a compliment to their other use? How many addicts only
abuse opioids regardless of where their addiction originated? Researchers have recently found that while
some powerful painkillers such as hydrocodone have abuse rates that track proportionally to the amount of
production, OxyContin abuse is outstripping production levels.311 Explanations for this diﬀerent trajectory
are currently lacking and need to be explored further.
Too much of the current policy debate operates as if the elimination of OxyContin would end the abuse
308See supra note 193.
309See James Zacny, Trends in the Abuse of Prescription Opioid Drugs, February 6, 2002 (available at:
www.painandchemicaldependency.org/presentations/ FRIDAY/GRANDBALLROOM/3Zacny900am.pdf).
310Id.
311Id.
53problem. Similarly, too many on the other side of the debate argue on the assumption that eliminating
deceptive patients and uneducated physicians would eliminate the problem of abuse all together. In fashioning
policy to minimize abuse, it is essential that policy makers are able to properly identify the origins and scope
of the abuse in question.
One area of research that is currently moving forward and carries great potential is the current search for
a method to produce opioid analgesics like OxyContin in a way that eliminates, or signiﬁcantly lowers,
the potential for abuse.312 Purdue Pharma has already invested more than $150 million in developing an
antagonist—a second drug added to the original drug that seeks to counter certain negative eﬀects—that
would neutralize the euphoric eﬀect of the drug if was tampered with.313 For those who took the pill as
directed, the pill would dissolve in the stomach as intended and deliver the necessary pain relief.314 Purdue
is hopeful that this new version of OxyContin, incorporating an antagonist, will be available by 2007.315
Though such attempts to ﬁnd a “magic bullet” to the opioid problem have been ongoing for over eighty
years316 – with creative addicts frequently ﬁnding ways to defeat the systems developed – it is a path
of research that has the potential to beneﬁt society signiﬁcantly, and as such it an eﬀort that should be
supported not only by the private sector, but by the public sector as well.
c. Creating Safe Harbors
In light of the fact that fear of sanction is a leading reason cited by physicians for their failure to properly
312See Blakeslee supra note 108.
313See Andrew Pollack, Company Said to Develop Substitute for Painkiller, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 2003. (also discusses a
claim by another company, Pain Therapuetics, that claimed it had developed a tamper-proof substitute for OxyContin); see
also Blakeslee supra note 108.
314Id.
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316See Acker supra note 67 at 74-93 (for an overview of the eﬀort in the 1920’s to ﬁnd a non-addicting opioid analgesic); see
also Blakeslee supra note 108 (describing addicts successful eﬀort to subvert technology to counter the addictive tendencies of
opiates in 1900’s).
54treat pain, it seems logical that eﬀorts should be made to reﬁne state and federal laws to provide clear safe
harbors for physicians treating pain according to accepted treatment guidelines. There are a number of
provisions to state pain policies that have been cited as likely to encourage further pain treatment.317 Some
of these include:
1.
The recognition that controlled substances are necessary to the public health.
2.
The recognition of pain management as a part of general medical practice.
3. The recognition that the medical use of opioids is a legitimate professional practice.
4.
The encouragement of pain management
5.
Concerns about regulatory scrutiny should be addressed and recognized
6. A prescription amount on its own is not suﬃcient to determine the legitimacy of a prescription
7.
Physical dependence and tolerance are not confused with “addiction.318
Provisions that currently exist in a number of state pain policies that deter adequate pain treatment include:
317See Joranson et al, supra note 14.
551.
A statement that opioids should only be used as a treatment of last resort.
2. Provisions where the belief that opioids hasten death is perpetuated
3.
Provisions are ambiguous regarding liability319
Certainly such reforms should be encouraged. It must be acknowledged, however, that reforms in terms of safe
harbor provisions can only achieve so much. In fact, studies have found that physicians vastly overestimate
the potential for regulatory or criminal sanction that may result from aggressive pain treatment.320 While
certainly the increase in prosecutions at the federal and state levels in recent years should be of concern
to doctors, simply asserting a fear of regulation, even when clear standards of appropriate pain care are
available, is not a suﬃcient justiﬁcation to ignore the pain needs of a patient in most cases.321 As Ben Rich
argues:
Rather than continuing the rhetoric of the last quarter century that speaks of scaling
these barriers with no accountability on the part of the health care system for
reform, we should design strategies for eradicating them which entails the active
involvement of the medical profession as a whole. Nothing would bring these long-
standing barriers down more quickly then a concerted eﬀort on the part of organized
medicine.322
c. Education
320See Martino supra note 36 at 332 (“the perception of regulatory risk far exceeds the reality); see also Lovrich Jr. & Ziegler
supra note 41; Alpers, supra note 36.
321See Rich supra note 11 at 64-67 (calling on physicians to take the moral responsibility to ensure that their patients are
treated adequately).
56Building on Rich’s argument, the medical establishment does bear a great deal of responsibility for the failure
to properly address the problem of pain both currently and in the past. Vast numbers of physicians lack the
proper training to treat pain adequately and thus could not make progress in alleviating suﬀering even if the
threat of regulatory discipline ceased to be an issue.323 Indeed, a lack of proper education in pain education
has been cited by many as major contributing factor to the explosion of OxyContin abuse – doctors simply
did not understand how to use opioid analgesics, nor did they understand how to identify and prevent abuse.
As Russell Portenoy—a champion of encouraging aggressive opioid-based pain treatment—explained the
problem:
Generalists are adopting the therapy without adequate knowledge of pain manage-
ment principles....but without adequate knowledge of opioid pharmacology and
addiction medicine principles and thereby perhaps placing patients at risk for the
adverse eﬀects of opioid drugs in this broad phenomenon of chemical dependency
that wouldn’t be there if the clinicians had better skills and training in addiction
medicine principles.324
If serious progress is going to be made on either the pain or the abuse front, immediate steps must be taken
to both require pain education in medical school and to require it on an ongoing basis throughout physicians’
careers.
To achieve this, several immediate steps could be taken. First, the federal government could require that
medical schools institute pain and palliative care training as a condition of federal funds.325 Second, the
federal government could require physicians take continuing education classes in both pain treatment and in
the identiﬁcation and prevention of addiction and abuse before they were granted registration to dispense
323See supra Section II, B, 2.
325See Amy J. Dilcher, Damned if They Do, Damned if They Don’t: The Need for a Comprehensive Public Policy to Address
the Inadequate Management of Pain, 13 Annals Health L. 81, 120 (2004).
57controlled substances.326 Both state medical boards and DEA oﬃcials should be also required to take similar
training courses to ensure that their knowledge is in line with the state of the art in pain management
techniques.
d. Accountability
Though legislative reform of safe harbors and increased education can certainly help to make progress in
encouraging adequate pain care, some argue that simply stopping there will not be enough. Advocates
such as Kathryn Tucker of Compassion in Dying and Ben Rich argue that physicians should be held up to
regulatory scrutiny and civil suits not just for overtreatment of pain, but also for undertreatment of pain as
well.327 Certainly, there is evidence to suggest that the mere existence of available education and regulatory
safe harbors will sometimes be inadequate to change physician behavior on its own.328
That being said, increased liability exposure and regulatory scrutiny in this area may have the eﬀect of driving
future doctors away from pain-relief intensive practices and further add to the cloud of regulatory scrutiny
that has already been cited as a source of concern in the medical profession.329 While disciplinary action for
undertreatment should always be available for egregious cases of negligence, it is not a spirit of confrontation,
but rather a spirit of partnership between physicians, state medical boards and law enforcement that needs
326A number of states have begun requiring similar training. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 2089, 2190.5 (West 2003) (requiring
medical training and continuing education in pain management and end-of-life care); W. Va. Professions and Occupations Code
§ 30-1-7a (2001) (mandating continuing education in end-of-life pain treatment).
327See Kathryn Tucker, A Piece of the Puzzle: Bringing Accountability to Failure to Treat Adequately, 6 Journal of Pallia-
tive Medicine 615, 615-617 (2003); Kathryn Tucker, Improving Pain Care: A Safe Harbor is Not Enough, 11 Health Lawyer
15 (1999); supra Rich note 11 at 70-90.
328Another ﬁnding of the SUPPORT study discussed earlier was that even after an intensive period of physician education
regarding the state of mind of patients and the physician’s legal protections, the failure to abide by end of life wishes and the
undertreatment of pain at the end of life continued to persist at the previous troubling levels. See supra note 6.
329See Martino supra note 36 at 344.
58to be fostered to at this time to begin to make progress again against the undertreatment of pain.
d. Cultural Shift & Partnership
If real progress is going to be made in ﬁnding an acceptable policy balance, strategies must be implemented
to build trust between law enforcement and physicians. Unlike the traditional model of law enforcement
toward illegal drugs, there is no reason to believe that the overwhelming majority of physicians don’t have
the same policy goals in terms of stemming abuse and addiction as their law enforcement partners. In that
vein, law enforcement should work to develop ways to integrate the medical profession as partners, rather
than adversaries, in the mission to stem the tide of opioid abuse. Similarly, physicians must begin to take
personal and institutional responsibility for the epidemic of undertreatment and take immediate steps, beyond
simply decrying physician prosecutions, to institute radical policy changes to ensure that all physicians are
adequately trained in pain relief and the identiﬁcation of prescription drug abuse and addiction. Together
with this, they must actively engage law enforcement in a constructive fashion to development joint plans
for curbing abuse of prescription drugs.
VI. Conclusion
Tens of millions of Americans suﬀer, and are in some cases debilitated, by chronic pain. Most Americans, at
some point, will be faced with terminal illness. Pain is a problem that has existed for as long as man itself.
For the ﬁrst time, however, there is medical technology available that can allow those who previously had to
suﬀer the chance to regain their independence or to enjoy the ﬁnal days life in peace. It is an opportunity that
59must be seized and the continuation of unnecessary suﬀering is shameful both to the medical establishment
and to policy makers who contribute to the problem.
With that in mind, it must be remembered that policy choices are not made in vacuums. As the OxyContin
crisis has shown, even well intentioned pain relief eﬀorts can have dramatic and devastating unintended
consequences. Though millions beneﬁt from the use of opioid analgesics, millions also suﬀer from them as
well. Though many see opioid analgesics such as OxyContin as a miracle drug, dozens of communities in
Virginia, Kentucky and Maine see it as a source of ﬁnancial, moral and social destruction.
It is the challenge of policy makers in the next decade, within both the medical profession and in law
enforcement to take suﬀering, suﬀering of all forms, seriously. Cooperation, therefore, must be a paramount
guiding principle. As Bruce Levin, a pain management fellow at Bellevue Hospital in New York City explains
his goal in treating pain patients, “We can’t take away pain altogether, but we can modulate it...We kind
of see ourselves as the last barrier between the patient and a life of agony.”330 For law enforcement oﬃcers
seeking to counter the agony inﬂicted on families and communities by prescription drug abuse, it is a message
to which they certainly can relate.
330Dr. Sandeep Jauhar, Calling in the Pain Team, Specialists in Suﬀering, N.Y. Times, June 23, 2002.
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